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Abstract
It is often difficult to forecast the future budgetary environment for today's space
systems. Indeed, multiple NASA missions and programs have been put into jeopardy or
cancelled outright, due to discrepancies between the expected and actual lifecycle costs.
This has resulted in the loss of billions of dollars in taxpayer money spent on false starts.
It is therefore in the best interests of all stakeholders, including NASA and the U.S.
Congress, to arrive at a solution which will allow NASA's space exploration endeavors to
be funded at a politically sustainable level.
Understanding the mechanisms and processes by which a program may exhibit politically
sustainability is of paramount importance to the space exploration enterprise. In
particular, budgetary sustainability has proven to be a driver for The President's Vision
for Space Exploration, which instructs NASA to "Implement a sustained and affordable"
space exploration program. NASA, as a federal agency, is dependent upon the support of
many stakeholders within the US political system, especially the President and members
of Congress. Thus, a politically sustainable program must address the needs of these
stakeholders.
Based upon strategies for agency-Congress interaction that are derived from the existing
political science literature, this thesis proposes to translate policy directives into technical
constraints or requirements for the Vision for Space Exploration. The effects of these
changes in the technical system are then traced back to determine how they effect the
political environment, articulating a feedback-loop that crosses between the political and
technical realms.
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Annalisa L. Weigel
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Historical Context
On February 1", 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia disintegrated upon reentry over
the skies of Texas. Columbia's seven crew members, Commander Rick D.
Husband, William C. McCool, Michael P. Anderson, David M. Brown, Kalpana
Chawla, Laurel Blair Salton Clark, and Ilan Ramon, were lost in the accident. In
the ensuing search operation, two civilian searchers, Jules F. Mier, and Charles
Krenek, were also lost in the line of duty. This had been the second Space Shuttle
lost. Responding to a plan set in place following the loss of the Shuttle Challenger
in 1986, NASA convened the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB).
An intensive examination of data relating to the loss of Columbia was undertaken,
eventually leading to the discovery of the technical flaw that led to the Shuttle's
loss. A piece of foam had fallen off of the Shuttle's external tank, impacting upon
the thermal protection system (TPS). This ultimately allowed superheated gas to
enter the Shuttle's left wing, leading to the eventual loss of control and the
Shuttle's breakup in mid flight. The CAIB report also revealed findings regarding
NASA's organizational culture, identifying a "...lack, over the past three decades,
of any national mandate providing NASA a compelling mission requiring human
presence in space.. .The result is the agency has found it necessary to gain the
support of diverse constituencies. NASA has had to participate in the give and
take of the normal political process in order to obtain the resources needed to
carry out its programs. NASA has usually failed to receive budgetary support
consistent with its ambitions. The result...is an organization straining to do too
much with too little." (Gehman, Barry et al. 2003)
What is the Goal of Human Spacelight?
Without a clear mandate, the future of the human spaceflight program was
brought into serious question. A space policy report released by the Space Studies
Board (SSB) in January 2004 highlighted this theme, stating that
"...without such a long-range goal the human spaceflight program's reasonfor
being is hard to articulate." (Bylery, Leshner et al 2004)
The U.S. Congress, the body elected to represent the will of the American people,
held hearings to address this issue. In October 2003 hearings on the future of
human spaceflight, Rep. Ralph Hall's opening statements captured the essence of
the dilemma facing human spaceflight:
'Mr. Chairman, budgets are likely to be tight for the foreseeable future.
That's the reality. As a result, it is even more important that Congress and
the Administration need to work together to come up with a clear set ofgoals
for the future of the human space flight program. Given goals, we can then
determine how much we can afford to expend on an annual basis towards
meeting those goals. I believe we have the means to start an exciting chapter
in human exploration. We just need to decide where we want to go and then
get started." (2003)
The Visionfor Space Exploration
On January 14, 2004, President George W. Bush responded to the calls for
direction in the human spaceflight program in announcing the Vision for Space
Exploration (VSE). Stating that "This cause of exploration and discovery is not
an option we choose; it is a desire written in the human heart", Bush committed
NASA and the nation to a multi-decade path that would ultimately return
humans to the Moon, and then initiate the exploration of Mars and places beyond
(Bush 2004).
The first step in implementing this plan called for the retirement of the Space
Shuttle in 2010, followed by the construction of a Crew Exploration Vehicle
(CEV), to be launched no later than 2014. NASA's human spaceflight program
was now charged with the task of "Implement[ing] a sustained and affordable
human and robotic program to explore the solar system and beyond", with the
ultimate objective being the "exten[sion of] human presence across the solar
system, starting with a human return to the Moon before the year 2020, in
preparation for human exploration of Mars and other destinations" (Bush 2004).
Thesis Objective: Incorporating Policy Considerations into Design
The Need to Consider Policy
In implementing this task, NASA is faced with a quandary. Development of a
large space exploration system is a complex problem that spans many disciplines.
Engineers designing any human-rated flight system for long-term space
habitation must take into account many potentially-conflicting factors. System
engineers must be concerned with the physical relation captured by Tsiolkovsky's
rocket equation, which ensures that payload mass will always be an important
driver of any system launched from Earth orbit (or any other appreciable gravity
well). Medical concerns dominate the environment of long-duration spaceflight,
where astronauts must be protected from the nocive effects of microgravity and
from space radiation. The thermal environment of any space-ship must also be
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closely monitored and regulated to ensure astronauts are protected from the
extreme temperatures of the space environment. Telecommunications with
ground control on Earth require construction and maintenance of an
infrastructure that can simultaneously compensate for weather effects, the
rotation of the globe, and the time-lags and power losses associated with
transmission over large distances. Space systems must also be powered, a feat
particularly difficult in the vacuum of space, where tradeoffs must be made
between solar power sources, fuel-cells and other, less traditional techniques, such
as nuclear fission reactors. Finally, any space vessel must be able to navigate its
way across vast distances to its eventual destination, be it the Moon, Mars, or a
space station on orbit. If the vessel is to enter through an atmosphere, it must
survive harsh re-entry conditions imposed by aerodynamic friction, often at
temperatures high enough to melt aluminum. All of these factors conspire to
create a complex series of tradeoffs and constraints that must be satisfied if
human spaceflight is to be achieved. It is therefore a testament to American, and
indeed human, prowess in engineering and design that spaceflight is even possible
at all. Nevertheless, this does not paint the complete picture. Whereas many of
the above problems can be solved through traditional engineering methodologies,
human spaceflight system architects have traditionally treated as exogenous the
political environment. The interactions between the multiple political entities that
influence the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), including
the Executive Office of the President, industry lobbies, Congress and many
others, are rarely taken explicitly into account. These are crucial in affecting the
ability of the American space program to meet its goals.
(Wirin 1999) makes a compelling argument for the importance of policy analysis
to space missions. In a manner typical of the traditional engineer, he characterizes
the policy environment as a limit on mission design, arguing that "[e]ngineers
accustomed to precise answers often find that legal and political issues intrude on
the space mission design process just when everything is going smoothly.. .Why
worry about law and policy? The simple answer is that a perfect engineering
solution is useless until it can be implemented." In other words, a system that is
designed without explicit consideration of political concerns faces design
irrelevance. Wirin argues that "space mission analysis and design must concern
itself with the vagaries of policy and the multitude of concerns and interests that
exist in the political arena".
Previous Work
How can we identify the effects of the policy environment on the technical
design? (Weigel and Hastings 2003; Weigel and Hastings 2004) provide the
motivation and groundwork for this query, linking policy direction to
architectural objectives, and finally to technical design parameters. A need for
"policy robust" architectures, those that can survive specific policy changes, is
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identified. The following
used to analyze the effects
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generic "impact path diagram" captures the process
of a political decision on technical choice.
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Figure 1: A generic influence diagram used to
translate policy direction into technical parameters.
Sourced from (Weigel and Hastings 2003).
Under this rubric, a policy robust architecture is one which minimizes the
number of technical design parameters that are impacted by a given policy. If a
design is insensitive to a given policy change, it is considered robust to that
policy.
(Singleton and Weigel 2005) and (Wooster, Hofstetter et al. 2005) provide
additional insight into interactions between the technical and political realms
within the context of NASA's Vision for Space Exploration, calling for a system
architecture that can manage political risk. In effect, they articulate a need to
understand how a technical choice might impact a political choice. The goal of
this thesis is to advance a framework that might allow the system architect to
trace such impacts.
Thesis Contribution: Political Sustainability
Today's aerospace systems are becoming increasingly complex, with longer design
lifecycles. In particular, many of NASA's systems, such as the International Space
Station, the Space Shuttle, and now, the Crew Exploration Vehicle, are to be
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operated for decades at a time. These lifecycle times appear increasingly extended
when contrasted with the American presidential term of four years, or a
Congressional turnover rate of two years. Thus, if such engineering systems are to
maintain the support required for continued operation, they must be able to
deliver value under a constantly shifting political environment. These systems,
and others, must therefore be designed with political sustainabiligy in mind. The
possibility of a change in stakeholders' support must be made an explicit part of
the design. Once the system has been designed, political sustainability becomes an
issue of maintaining the support that currently exists and potentially building the
base for future support. In the case of NASA's systems, this support is generally
manifested in the contest for budgetary resources. Therefore, this thesis examines
the dynamics underlying budgetag political sustainabiliy. Design for budgetary
political sustainability requires that plans and designs that are made up-front do
not undermine future goals. To the largest extent possible, a non-myopic, or
long-term, perspective must be taken.
The primary purpose of this thesis is to illustrate a design methodology by which
designers working within a federal agency might interact with the political
process. In particular, the focus is on NASA's directive to accomplish the VSE
announced by President Bush on January 14, 2004. This document is aimed at
providing the system architect with a tool that may provide some measure of
understanding and control of the interactions between a given technical choice
and the political process. We focus on interactions between NASA, acting as an
agent of the President, and Congress, the organization that reflects the will of the
American people and provides funding. We explore how a system architect might
affect policy outcomes. In doing so, we hope to explicitly integrate political
sustainability into system design.
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The concept of "Political Sustainability" is motivated by the 1987 Report on
the World Commission on Environment and Development, the so-called
"Brundtland Report". This work asserts:
"Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the abiliy offuture generations to meet
their own needs"(Brundtland, Khalid et al 1987)
This thesis recognizes that politics requires a constant balance between
fulfilling current needs and maintaining relationships for the future.
Therefore, we define political sustainability as follows:
An action is politically sustainable if it allows for the fulfillment of
current political goals and resource needs without compromising future
goals and needs.
Politically sustainable actions simultaneously build support for, and advance,
an item on the political agenda. Actions that are not politically sustainable
advance a current agenda item at the expense of future support.
Framework: The Policy-Technology Feedback Cycle
This thesis will focus specifically on the budgetary political sustainability of using
legacy components in the design of the Crew Exploration Vehicle. The decision
to separate CEV functionality into multiple "blocks" - one for Low Earth Orbit
(LEO) capability and one for Lunar and Martian capability, will be explored,
using the MIT Concept Exploration and Refinement (CER) Study and NASA's
Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) as baselines. The intent is to
trace the effects of using legacy components through the design process, and
therefore to provide a framework under which decisions to use legacy
components can be evaluated.
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Figure 2: The Policy-Technology Feedback Cycle represents a
framework that the system architect can use to trace the impacts of
technical performance on national policy and vice versa.
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The above diagram represents the notion that policy and technology constitute
components of a techno-political system. Just as a policy change can impact technical
parameters, changes to a technical system have the potential to propagate in such
a way as to affect change in the political domain. The system architect, as the
interlocutor between the political and technical domains, has the capability to
trace these impacts through careful analysis. Each chapter in this thesis focuses
on a specific set of components of this cycle, articulating how the implementation
of the VSE is driven by Congressional and Presidential political concerns, and
how technical choices, such as the decision to introduce certain kinds of legacy
technology into the system design, can impact the political process. These
impacts are traced across three domains, as follows:
The Polig Domain: From Congressional and Presidential Policies to Law
In order for any bill to become adopted as national policy within the United
States of America, it must be passed by the Congress, the government's
Legislative branch, and then signed into law by the President, leader of the
Executive Branch. The structure of the government is such that each Branch
(including the Legislative, Executive and Judicial branches) has a means to
countermand an action taken by the others. For example, the President may veto
any act of Congress, but the Congress can override that veto with a 3/4 majority.
Similarly, the Judiciary can declare any act of Congress or the President
unconstitutional. This system ensures that no one branch has unbridled power.
Since the President and members of Congress are elected officials, this system
ensures that few laws that are passed are inconsistent with the will of the
electorate.
Each year, Congress passes the United States budget into law. The process by
which this occurs is long and involved for both the Executive and Legislative
branches. In order for an agency to successfully request funding, it must generally
begin negotiations with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) within the
Executive Branch as many as two years prior to the time the funding is actually
required. The interim time is used in negotiation.
Within NASA, individual project managers must submit funding requests for
their projects to program managers. These program managers must then respond
to the Director of their NASA center as well as to the specific Mission
Directorate to which they report. The Center Directors and Mission Directorate
Heads then report directly to the Office of the NASA Administrator, where the
budget requests are aggregated. Furthermore, Center Directors require funds for
institutional expenses, such as facility maintenance and utilities. Given that NASA
Centers bring employment to local districts, members of Congress may choose to
involve themselves in the budgetary process at this stage, sending signals to
NASA that certain programs or facilities should receive additional funding. The
21
NASA Comptroller is simultaneously engaging in negotiations with
representatives of the Office of Management and Budget to obtain an expected
figure for how much funding might be available if a request is made. Eventually,
an agency budget request is submitted to the OMB, who responds with a
"passback" to NASA. This gives the agency the ability to appeal a specific budget
request potentially allowing for negotiation that could go to the level of the
President. In practice, such negotiations rarely move beyond the OMB, which is
responsible for aggregating the President's budget request for the entire nation.
This request is then submitted to Congress on behalf of the President several
months prior to the end of the fiscal year.
In Congress, a funding request must also undergo multiple stages. The Congress
is divided into two Houses, the 435-member House of Representatives, and the
100-member Senate. Each of these Houses is divided into Committees that are
further divided into Subcommittees. The first budgetary stage, referred to as
"authorization", is a statement of policy on the part of that House of Congress
generally indicating that the nation should undertake a certain action. For
example, one of these subcommittees can recommend that NASA engage in the
VSE as proposed by the President. Authorizers may control the budget by
imposing a spending cap for a given agency, or even a given program within that
agency. Nevertheless, authorizers are unable to appropriate funding for an
agency, as per rules imposed within each House of Congress. The
subcommittee's proposal must be approved by the parent committee, and then
sent to the entire House of Congress for approval. At each stage, the
authorization bill may be amended, aggregated with other bills, or traded against
other priorities. Finally, the bill goes to a joint conference with the other House
of Congress, resulting in a proposal that, once approved by both Houses, is sent
to the President. The President may then choose to sign the bill into law or to
veto it.
Once an agency has received authorization, it is up to the Congressional
committees on appropriations (one in each house of Congress) to propose
legislation that actually allocates funds. Subcommittees of the Committee on
Appropriations must generally consider, and therefore aggregate, the requests of
multiple agencies. An appropriations bill then goes through the same process as
an authorization bill, requiring approval within each house, joint conference, and
finally signature by the President. In the event that no authorization bill has been
passed, the appropriations committee may pass a "continuing resolution" that
allows for an agency to be funded at the same level as it has been in the past.
Although theoretically possible, it is very rare that an agency will receive no
funding. It is only after this process has been completed that an agency may
receive funding for a project. More information about the appropriations process
may be found in (Streeter 2004).
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The Architectural Domain: From Law to Requirements
Once a law is passed by Congress and signed by the President, it is the role of the
systems architect to determine how an agency may best implement this directive.
The architect is particularly concerned with such high-level parameters as system
cost, performance and schedule. Generally a policy directive will place bounds on
all three of these. For example, the VSE directs NASA to retire the Shuttle by
2010, construct a CEV before 2014, and return to the Moon before 2020.
Furthermore, this must occur in a "sustained and affordable" manner (Bush
2004). The role of the system architect is to translate these policy directives into
"0-level requirements", or technical parameters that may eventually be used for
conceptual design.
The Technical Domain: From Requirements to Hardware and Back Again
Once 0-level requirements have been generated, it is the role of a team of systems
engineers, working together with technical specialists, to generate a specific
design concept. This team is then responsible for executing a "requirements
flowdown", creating low-level requirements from higher-level requirements.
These are eventually intended to move beyond conceptual design into the
detailed design phase. Nevertheless, system engineers must be wary of how the
complex parts of a technical system interact. In particular, if a policy directive
inspires change in a pre-existing design, the savvy system engineer must be aware
of how that change will propagate through the system, the effects that such a
change might have on the system's ability to operate, and how performance, cost
and schedule could be impacted. The system architect must be able to translate
the results and assumptions underlying cost engineering results into a format that
an agency's legislative affairs specialists might understand. This, in turn, will affect
how that agency approaches the 0MB and Congress and how national policy is
made in the future.
This thesis will trace the process described above; focusing at times on how the
use of legacy components might affect the ability of NASA to carry out a
potential Congressional directive to reduce the development time of the CEV so
that lacks American access to space is minimized. The ultimate goal is to illustrate
how such a policy change can propagate through the techno-political system,
eventually affecting the policy that first called for CEV development, the
President's VSE. Throughout this entire process, modeling assumptions and
limitations must be made explicit. Like any model, the results in this thesis are
only as good as the assumptions that underlie it. It is therefore incumbent upon
the author to examine the effects of varying these assumptions systematically, in a
"sensitivity analysis" of sorts.
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It must be stressed that the primary contribution of this thesis is not intended to
be in the results of the model. Rather, the process by which these results are
derived is intended to provide a methodology that system architects may use to
evaluate how policies affect technologies and vice versa. The role of technical and
political experts cannot be discounted, as they provide the crucial checks of the
assumptions underlying this model, thereby grounding it in reality.
Thesis Structure
This thesis is separated into seven chapters as follows:
This first chapter serves as an introduction to this thesis and outlines its structure
and motivation.
The second chapter provides an overview of the existing literature linking
technology and policy. In particular, it examines values that affect the budgetary
process within the context of the American political system. This chapter also
examines the other side of the equation - namely, Congressional valuations. In
doing so, it explores the determinants behind Congress' budget in a qualitative
manner.
The third chapter focuses on the specific technical implementation of a multi-
block CEV architecture, outlining three ways in which legacy components might
be used.
The fourth chapter examines how the cost of each of these components might
change throughout the lifetime of the system and provides insight into how each
of the different types of legacy component uses affect the cost of space system
development.
The fifth chapter provides a strategic overview and a logic that NASA might use
in deciding when, and when not to use certain types of legacy components.
The sixth chapter integrates all of the previous chapters to provide a description
of how certain legacy component use might affect the eventual goal of return to
the Moon.
Finally, the seventh chapter concludes this thesis and provides an overview of the
analysis process. Areas for future research are also identified.
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Chapter 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter explores the determinants of decision-making in the engineering and
political realms, with the intention of demonstrating how these decisions translate
to cost, schedule and performance parameters (see Figure 3).
Political Domain Architectural Domain Technical Domain
Modulation of cost,
schedule, and
Congressional performance Technical
Policy \Component
National 
-Selection
Presidential / olicy
Policy
Sensitivity Analysis Technical
Feasibility Studies
Strategic .. . .
Analysis System Effects
Propagation
Cost Impact
Analysis
Figure 3: This chapter articulates the transition from the political
domain to the architectural domain within the policy-technology
feedback cycle.
Decision-Making in the Political and Technical Environments
In order to better understand how events may impact the political environment,
we turn to the political science literature. In particular, studies of administrative,
bureaucratic and Congressional decision-making are instructive in determining
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how an engineering system interacts with the political realm. In order to best
model behavior in each realm, we first examine how decisions are made.
Roots and Branches
Perhaps the primary difference between an engineering decision and a political
decision is the method by which conclusions are achieved. Whereas traditional
engineering strives for rationality and optimal trades between clear objectives,
political decisions are largely marked by compromise aimed at building
supporting coalitions. Furthermore, the complexities of the political environment
impose considerable limitations on rational choice. (Lindblom 1959) discusses
these limitations in detail by identifying two paradigms for approaching a
problem. The first, which he calls the "Rational-Comprehensive" or "root"
method, is a description of a rational/positivist approach in which a decision
maker will begin by clarifying values or objectives and then formulate
comprehensive policy through means-end analysis. This method, representing the
archetype of ideal engineering design, requires evaluating every alternative in a
particular decision space and, although it is theoretically mathematically tractable,
it requires a clear definition of goals and, perhaps more importantly, a well-
defined utility function that can be used to distinguish between outcomes. When
executed properly, a rational design yields a result that maximizes some
performance metric within the basis of well-understood scientific theory. Thus,
reliance on theory is the cornerstone of the root method.
Lindblom argues that genuine execution of the Rational-Comprehensive method
for all but the simplest problems lies beyond the memory capacity of any human
being. Engineers, generally possessing design goals, can circumvent these
limitations using tools designed to identify an optimal design upon the basis of
generalizable theory. The complexity of the political environment, on the other
hand, is currently beyond the reach and understanding of any encompassing
predictive theory. Furthermore, the existence of multiple independent intelligent
actors suggests that any high-fidelity prediction is naturally intractable. In order to
describe decision-making in this regime, Lindblom defines the method of
"Successive Limited Comparisons", or the "branch" method, which argues that
the decision making process is one in which identification of values and goals are
not separate from empirical analysis. Similarly, means and ends are not distinct,
implying that a goal is generally not well-defined. Furthermore, since means-ends
analysis is limited to those few alternatives that the decision maker can
simultaneously consider, possible outcomes, policies and values are often not
considered at all. Lindblom claims that, in the vast majority of cases, a decision
maker will rely upon the branch method due to the fact that the computational
power and data that are required to achieve the root method are generally not
available. This represents the standard archetype of political decision-making.
Resulting policies are therefore likely to be suboptimal from a purely rationalist
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standpoint. Where engineering design is aimed at maximizing lifecycle
performance, politics aims to maximize immediate desirability so that an item
may be cleared from the policy-maker's agenda.
The method of Successive Limited Comparisons highlights the importance of a
providing a diversity of viewpoints to decision makers since they will only be able
to choose between the arguments that are directly available and salient to them.
This provides an implicit justification for a group to undertake advocacy activities
since, without them, decision makers will naturally tend to forget about or ignore
the viewpoints and goals that that particular group represents. Perhaps more
importantly, it indicates that an actor who controls the flow of information
concurrent with technical expertise possesses some degree of control over the
final decision that is made. It is exactly this type of control that NASA, or any
other administrative agency, can exercise in its interactions with Congress.
Salience and Attention
The stage is set for a description of the policy-making process as a battle between
interest groups for salience within decision makers' limited attention resources. In
the face of numerous pressing concerns from all sides, a policy maker will by
necessity choose those alternatives that are directly within reach and most likely
to simultaneously satisfy the largest number of stakeholders in the short-term.
This suggests an environment of pure competition between interest groups
wherein each group attempts to dominate the attention of the decision maker.
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the branch method also allows for agreement
on policies without a necessary agreement on the goals that those policies might
imply. Therefore, cooperation and coalition-building between groups that might
both stand to gain from a particular policy occurs, even though these groups
might have completely different viewpoints and opposing goals. A savvy
politician builds consensus one step at a time, helping various groups achieve
intermediate goals, to the extent that those goals are congruent with his/her
ultimate goal.
The ability to agree on means when ends are in stark contrast is foreign to the
traditional engineering mentality, which typically identifies a set of design goals
and trades design parameters against this goal until exogenously-imposed
requirements are fulfilled. Since political decision-makers often set, or must at
least approve, the high-level goals of a publicly-funded endeavor, the above
argument provides an explanation for why publicly-funded systems are subject to
changing policy priorities. This, in turn, calls for an examination of how political
goal-setting takes place.
28
Goals and Values
(Van Dyke 1962) follows Lindblom's lead in suggesting that values may be
defined as either "goal values", which are necessary in and of themselves and
"instrumental values" that are necessary to the performance of another goal. He
explains that a "goal value" is defined by the particular organization or individual
in question, and that one organization's goal value might be another's
instrumental value. This is particularly true for engineering systems, where the
design goal of the system is likely to deliver instrumental value rather than directly
serving a policy-maker's goal values. A case in point of this dynamic is the goal
value of space exploration championed by NASA. Depending on the desires of
the President and Congress of the time, this goal value was generally instrumental
towards accomplishing some other goal. For example, the Apollo program was
instrumental to defeating the Russians in a Cold War space race; the Shuttle
program was instrumental as a high-tech re-election campaign; the International
Space Station was instrumental first to demonstrate to the Soviet Union the
resolve of the free world, and later, to employ Russian scientists who might
otherwise contribute to nuclear proliferation. Thus, NASA's relevance to a
political decision-maker increases or decreases to the extent that space
exploration is instrumental to the goal values of the Presidency and Congress.
Stakeholders' goal values may be ranked using the Hierarchy of Needs proposed in
(Maslow 1970).
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Figure 4: Maslow's "hierarchy of needs". An
individual's attention is immediately diverted
towards its most basic need when that need is
endangered. Image sourced from (Maslow).
An instrumental goal is more likely to get support when it is linked to a goal value
that is low on the pyramid, such as "security" or "safety". This has implications
for coalition building because an interest group might be willing to support a
given policy even though that policy might not be directly related to that group's
"goal value". If a case can be made that the policy, as executed, would serve as an
instrumental goal for that interest group, then that interest group may provide
support. Similarly, if a seemingly irrevocable conflict should arise between interest
groups, a solution might be found by redirecting attention away from the value
goals in conflict toward those instrumental goals that are held in common. To
paraphrase Charles Dudley Warner, politics does indeed make strange bedfellows.
Van Dyke's work has important implications for the designer, suggesting that
technical expertise in administration is relied upon to promote politically selected
values, an argument also suggested in (Jasanoff 1987). In the case of NASA, this
suggests that any exploration architecture must actively seek relevance to current
national policy. This further suggests that activities that are not directly relevant
will not receive attention and will, at best, be left "idling" with incremental
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funding and, at worst, be cut. At the same time, NASA has a unique role as the
technical experts in all things related to their mandate in civil aerospace. As such,
they are in a unique role to control the flow of information. Thus, once a
congressional directive is issued, NASA has enormous power in determining the
implementation for how that directive will be fulfilled and in what options are
under consideration. Whereas Maslow's hierarchy suggests that salience may be
achieved by putting a given value under threat, Van Dyke suggests that salience
may be achieved through direct relevance to existing national priorities. This
further suggests that the designer should explicitly consider the goal values that
the system to be designed is intended to achieve. This is complicated by the fact
that there are often many goal values - at least one for each stakeholder group -
and that they may be in conflict. In this case, Van Dyke suggests that the best
course of action is to alert the stakeholders of the potential conflicts and of the
tradeoffs that will have to be made. This gives the stakeholders a sense of
responsibility and ownership in the process, and allows for ease of negotiation. In
the words of Otto von Bismarck, "politics is the art of the possible". It is
therefore the role of the technical expert to outline the space of possible options.
At the same time, efforts must be undertaken by supporters of a given system
design to illustrate to political decision-makers the consequences of changing
resource allocations.
It is worth noting that linkage to a high-salience agenda item, such as a particular
national security concern, is a double-edged sword. Whereas such a linkage is
likely to ensure the program significant support in the short-term, eventual
solution of the high-salience problem is likely to lead to the determination that so
much support is no longer necessary. On the other hand, linkage to an item that
is of lower salience, such as an ongoing mission of scientific discovery, is likely to
receive less funding on an annual basis but is also likely to be more robust to large
swings in support.
Role-based Actions
The above analysis illustrates some motivations behind the swiftly-changing
nature of the political process. The political system is sufficiently complex that it
likely lies beyond any current predictive capacity. Nonetheless, it is possible to
outline certain patterns of behavior that seem to occur with regularity. (Simon
1964) notes that although individual members of an organization might be very
different people, they must fulfill their organizational "roles". For example, an
OMB examiner will seek to reduce costs and increase efficiency regardless of the
person holding that role. The role therefore defines, to some extent, the actions
of the individuals holding that role. Although personal goals do play a part in
organizations, Simon notes that actions on the basis of personal goals will be
small compared to actions on the basis of role goals because of training and self-
31
selection. One can therefore infer an organization's goal simply from its behavior,
since any action not taken is prevented by a constraint. As such, we may draw
general conclusions about the behavior of specific types of political actors.
Indeed, agencies often rely on this quasi-predictable type of behavior when
generating budgetary strategy.
(Kingdon 2003) outlines the roles of several major players within the U.S.
government. This book is a valuable source for any student of policy, providing
quantitative and anecdotal evidence to support descriptions of policy actors and
the types of power that they wield. A model of how policies are generated is then
created, based upon the ethos of (Cohen, March et al. 1972), which essentially
describes organizational choice as occurring in an almost unpredictable semi-
chaotic fashion, driven by a complicated interplay of multiple streams. In
particular, Kingdon characterizes three "streams" of policy-making - the Political
Stream, the Policy Stream, and the Problems Stream. The Political Stream,
composed of "such things as public mood, pressure group campaigns, election
results, partisan or ideological distributions in Congress, and changes of
administration", characterizes that element of the policy-making process that is
colloquially identified as "politics". The author explains the events of the Political
Stream in some detail, describing it as a promoter of agenda items. The Policy
Stream, on the other hand, is largely dominated by specialists in a certain field,
such as agency civil servants. Solutions are generated, often without specific
problems to which these solutions might be attached, generating the
phenomenon of "solutions looking for problems". The primary role of the
members of the Policy Stream is to narrow the set of all possible policy proposals
into a short list of those that are both technically feasible and may be seriously
considered. Kingdon further classifies policy communities within this stream as
either fragmented or non-fragmented, noting that fragmented communities, those
that are composed of many diverse interests, are generally less successful because
of their lack of coordination. This point is supported by the work of (Olson
1984). Kingdon draws parallels between the fragmentation of a policy community
and the fragmentation of the associated political system, arguing that more
fragmented systems require more overhead coordination. Finally, there is the
Problems Stream, in which specific issues become taken up by the public and are
brought to the attention of the electorate. This stream is largely influenced by
leading indicators that policy makers can use to measure the efficacy of a
problem's solution. Problems that are not initially salient are brought to policy
makers' attentions through "focusing events", such as crises, accidents or
symbolic actions. Kingdon describes the coming together of these three streams
as the creation of a "policy window" through which a successful policy
entrepreneur can achieve a lasting action. For a specific issue, these windows are
generally short-lived and must be acted upon promptly when discovered, thus
necessitating that a successful policy entrepreneur be constantly prepared to take
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advantage of changing circumstances. For a given technical design, this suggests
that policy advocates will attempt to justify the system as a potential solution to
an existing problem for which the system might previously have had no
requirement.
Budgetary Politics
(Wildavsky 1964) is a detailed studied of agency-Congress interactions and the
attempts that agencies might use in order to assure and/or increase their yearly
budget. Casting budget requests as well-thought-out strategies made by each
agency, a budget request is generally aimed at getting the agency the maximum
amount of money requested, but not so much that the request loses credibility.
Arguing that "If politics is regarded in part as conflict over whose preferences
shall prevail in the determination of national policy, then the budget records the
outcome of this struggle", Wildavsky characterizes executive branch agencies as
organizational actors whose primary goal is to maximize their budget on a yearly
basis. In his analysis, he identifies numerous strategies used by each agency in this
endeavor, devoting an entire chapter to their description. Many of Wildavsky's
strategies are insightful and the savvy system architect may make use of them to
incorporate design rules that can aid the political supporters of the program.
Budgetary Incrementalism
Wildavsky argues that limited Congressional attention and budgetary resources,
combined with each agency's simultaneous attempt to defend or increase its
budget will result in "incrementalism", a state wherein each year, a budget may
only increase or decrease slightly relative to the previous year's baseline. This has
significant implications for technical design in that one can not expect any sharp
spikes in funding, even though such increases might be necessary to see a
program transition from its development phase to its operations phase; rather the
agency's budgetary profile must be relatively constant over time. This suggests
that as one project starts to consume more resources, the necessary funding will
have to come from other projects. This funding will invariably come from those
projects that do not have strong supporters defending them. This is particularly
problematic within an agency like NASA where operations costs and sustainment
have traditionally been high, stifling new development. Indeed, it is more likely
that a political actor will defend a program that is already operating than one that
is still in its conceptual or development phase, and therefore delivering no
concrete results to a constituent base. Most importantly, Wildavsky's empirically-
derived observation links political events to budgetary salience, suggesting that
without a clear goal established by political mandate, no agency, including NASA,
can expect significant funding changes. On the one hand, this suggests that large
development programs that do not fit within the current budget are unlikely to be
funded. On the other hand, this observation reveals a sort of safety net,
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essentially guaranteeing that, in the absence of extenuating circumstances, NASA
is unlikely to lose its current funding level for the foreseeable future. As such, an
agency's survival is a sort of existence proof that it provides a valuable
contribution to society. It is only when an agency tries to increase its budget that
it must justify its added value against that of its competitors.
(Davis, Dempster et al. 1966; Davis, Dempster et al. 1974) build off of
Wildavsky's work by creating a mathematical description of budgetary agency
allocations for each year, noting that Congress tends to follow an incremental
strategy in allocating funding to agencies. In effect, they note that, in the absence
of what they term "political shocks", agencies will receive approximately what
they received in the previous year plus some fraction of what they requested. The
motivation for this description is that Congress, lacking the attention resources to
re-construct the budget from the ground up every year, must instead look at the
previous budget for its guidelines and base the new budget on this data.
Budgetary data from many agencies confirms the incremental hypothesis for
some length of time, although incremental periods are often separated by short
(one- or two-year-long) periods of non-incremental behavior. These sources
provide no means of predicting these shocks, rendering their theory descriptive
rather than predictive. Nonetheless, it is instructive to observe that, since the end
of the Apollo program, NASA's budget and activities have become increasingly
characterized as incremental in recent years, particularly as Congressional
influence over NASA's budgetary process became stronger. (Jahnige 1968),
written near the end of the Apollo program, describes this process in detail,
observing that NASA, which had previously been impervious to Congressional
oversight due to its strong presidential support and highly technical nature was
now subject to an increasingly aware Congress that began to exert more control
in curtailing NASA's spending activities largely through the employ of technically-
capable staffers.
The Politics of Space Exploration
The effects of Congressional attention on American space policy is recounted in
detail in (Johnson-Freese 2003). Noting that several members of Congress see
NASA as "an entitlement or jobs program for its employees and contractors", the
author concludes that costs tend to grow significantly when spent for political
rather than technical purposes. This perception is strengthened by the fact that
the scientific and technical nature of space activities is often viewed as arcane and
beyond the grasp of the average Congress member. This, in turn, motivates a
focus on other, more directly salient concerns, such as geographic distribution of
jobs. Regardless of the Congress member's personal beliefs, each member is
motivated to remain in his or her elected position, thus requiring that benefits be
provided to constituents. (Roust 2002) elaborates on this hypothesis,
demonstrating the role-based power of specific committee members on NASA
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allocations. Thus, in order to be politically relevant, NASA must ensure that its
money is spent in line with the political powers-that-be. As a multi-member
legislature, Congress is often home to many differing and sometimes changing,
opinions. In the absence of strong and sustained Presidential leadership, these
opinions will come to dominate NASA's agenda, often resulting in changing
requirements and redesigns, as NASA tries to adapt to serve all constituencies.
Nonetheless, individual Congress-members need to maintain a reputation for
responsibility, both to their constituents and to the nation. This means that, in the
face of cost- and schedule- overruns, Congress members will demand
accountability even if the lag in performance metrics is in part created by
Congressional politics. Noting that "...incrementalism occurs when the decision-
maker lacks the information and knowledge to put forward space policy goals",Johnson-Freese ties Congressional action to the work of Wildavsky, suggesting
that incrementalism is a specific strategy employed by a non-technical Congress
to ensure oversight of, and some measure of control over, NASA's programs.
(Logsdon 1986; McCurdy 1990) both elaborate on the extent to which NASA has
adopted an incremental, coalition-based strategy in its dealings with an
increasingly powerful Congress. Specifically, they address the circumstances
surrounding the creation of the Space Shuttle and the International Space Station,
both of which resulted in designs that are suboptimal from a purely technical
standpoint but are nonetheless strong sources of Congressional benefits.
Nevertheless, a question remains as to their efficacy in accomplishing the goals of
Presidential politics. (Johnson-Freese 2003) observes that "[a]s long as the status
quo is maintained, Congress seems content to remain mostly a benign
benefactor... [t]he result is that Congress is not generally able to force coherent
long-term change, nor does it really want to. Instead, legislative solutions tend to
be across the board budget percentage cuts or caps to which agencies adapt to as
best as possible. This often means continual downsizing of programs, but not a
pruning out or elimination of anyone's particular program. It also explains why
NASA's programs, such as ISS today, are often over budget and behind
schedule". Many of NASA's cost and schedule problems are exacerbated, if not
caused, by the political environment in which it sits. Thus, it would seem that the
CAIB's conclusions regarding the political environment in which NASA exists
represent the norm rather than the deviation. We may therefore expect such
behavior to continue for some time to come.
Incrementalism in the Visionfor Space Exploration
The Vision for Space Exploration, presumably anticipating Congressional
incrementalism, advances a relatively constant NASA budget proposal for the
long-term, increasing only to adjust for expected inflation rates after FY09 (see
Figure 5). Unlike the days of the Apollo program, when schedule, rather than
cost, was the primary mission driver, one may expect NASA's budget to remain
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largely constrained within this funding envelope. Furthermore, it is not
inconceivable that funding might decrease in the face of shifting priorities.
Exploration Strategy Based on Long-Term Affordability
Prut at. F l.%r
Figure 5. The following "sandchart", representing
NASA's expected budget through time, shows a
slight increase in NASA funding, after which the
budget increases linearly in real dollars, in effect
remaining constant with inflation. Source: (NASA
2004)
The linear budget predicted after FY07 is consistent with the incremental model
of budgeting, which asserts that, for an agency, "models of the of the budgetary
process are linear, stochastic, and strategic in character" (Davis, Dempster et al.
1966). An agency-level examination of recent NASA budgetary appropriations
does indeed yield a roughly linear time-series, as shown in Figure 6. The
stochastic nature of these appropriations characterizes the slight deviations from
the linear approximation. Furthermore, NASA has previously been characterized
as an incremental organization following the end of the Apollo era (McCurdy
1990).
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NASA Budget, 1998-2004
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Figure 6. The above chart portrays NASA's total
budget as granted by Congress, in real dollars. Note
that it increases roughly linearly through time. A
true incremental model would also incorporate data
pertaining to the agency's budget request, perhaps
providing a stronger correlation (NASA 2006).
Note that Figure 5 predicts very gradual growth through time for most of
NASA's programs, with the exception that, as programs retire, their funds are
folded into the Crew Exploration Vehicle and Exploration Missions. In general,
this sandchart is devoid of sharp increases or decreases in funding on a yearly
basis, that might belie the presence of conflict or changing priorities within the
budgetary process. Nevertheless, incrementalism cannot be generalized to the
programmatic level (Natchez and Bupp 1973).
Figure 7 shows the same data as in Figure 6, except that here, budget is broken
down by program, rather than aggregated at the agency level.
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NASA Program Budgets 1998-2004
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Figure 7: The above chart displays the same
budgetary data as in Figure 6, broken down by
program. The data are characterized by sharp,
nonlinear changes associated with reorganizations
(in FY2000) and shifting priorities (between
FY2002 and FY2003) (NASA 2006).
Each program component historically underwent periods of non-incremental
behavior. Comparing 2002 to 2003, for example, one notes a one-billion dollar
shift from "Science, Aeronautics and Technology" toward "Human Space
Flight". In 2004, much of this funding is restored. In addition, the year 2000 saw
the folding of "Mission Support" into the other two budgetary categories. This
suggests that there are political forces at work beyond the traditional budgetary
"satisficing" (Lindblom 1959). Indeed, previous work has faulted the incremental
model for its inability to capture such program-level dynamics. An incremental
analysis is therefore insufficient to be able to characterize the program-level
budgetary environment through time. Since engineering systems are generally
designed within the context of a program, rather than within the context of an
entire agency, we must focus on determining the causes of these program-level
dynamics.
Program-LevelPoliics
(Natchez and Bupp 1973) critiques the incremental model of budgeting; arguing
that although the outcome of the budgetary process may indeed be incremental,
the politics and the struggles leading to such an outcome are far from
deterministic. Their examinations of the Atomic Energy Commission's budget
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reveal that, although the agency budget possessed a relatively linear incremental
profile over time, individual programs were subject to wild swings in budgetary
favor that correlated with executive branch policies. Figure 7 shows a similar
outcome; whereas the overall agency profile is relatively constant, the
disaggregated budgets are subject to changes of up to $1 billion per year, an
appreciable amount compared to the agency's overall budget of about $15 billion.
This suggests that although an agency's budget is likely to be stable over time, a
specific program is much more subject to unpredictable political perturbations.
This is especially true if such a program is "invisible" to Congress. Without
congressional support, such a program is much more likely to be used as a
political bargaining chip within the Executive Branch, potentially endangering its
future survival. This is particularly true if the program has neither Congressional
nor Presidential salience. Lacking a powerful constituency to support it, the
program is likely to be cut so as to free funding for other priorities. This, in turn,
raises the question of how a program might achieve Congressional or Presidential
salience, thus guaranteeing at least some measure of stability of funding.
Congress-Agency Interactions
(Cohen and Noll 1991) analyzes this problem as it relates to R&D projects within
the context of the American federal system, drawing some general conclusions
regarding the comparative roles of Congress and the President. Their conclusions
are somewhat bleak, noting that "American political institutions introduce
predictable, systematic biases into R&D programs so that, on balance,
government programs will be susceptible to performance underruns and cost
overruns". Nonetheless, the authors make important comments regarding how a
program might achieve electoral salience, outlining three general types of
circumstances. The first of these occurs when an R&D project is directly related
to the state of the nation. Examples include the space race with the Soviet Union
culminating in the Apollo program, the energy crisis of the 1970s leading to a
brief increase in funding for alternative energy sources, and the Strategic Defense
Initiative (Star Wars) missile defense system proposed during the Reagan
administration. A second instance in which R&D programs become salient is the
fallout resulting from a disaster or some event that exposes mismanagement or
corruption within the program. Finally, the authors cite distributive effects;
specifically the money and jobs created within the districts of individual members
of Congress, and campaign contributions required for re-election. This particular
circumstance becomes especially important when many individual constituents
have a stake in the continuation of a program. The authors link political salience
to contract size noting that positive spillover effects from increased employment
increase salience for political representatives, eventually reaching beyond
congressional districts and potentially into the attention of senators and possibly
even presidential candidates. Nonetheless, as a program size continues to grow, it
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will eventually reach a point of diminishing political returns. A notional diagram
of this concept is show in Figure 8.
Political Salience
President's Salience: ------------------------------------
National-level
Sentors Sliece: --------------------------Senator's ali nce:
State-level
Representative's Salience: ----------------
District-level
Contract Size ($)
Figure 8: Notional representation of the effects of
contract size on political salience
It is worth noting that a program that promises electoral advantages for the
future is much less likely to receive support than a program that is currently
delivering value. This is largely due to the uncertainty surrounding who will
receive development contracts. Cohen and Noll note that "citizens who are
unaware that they are destined to be employed in the new program are unlikely to
engage in political behavior motivated by its enactment. Once contracts are
awarded and workers are hired... identifiable and organized groups (firms, unions,
local governments) have a clear stake." This sort of behavior, in which potential
losses loom larger than potential gains, is well-documented in the risk-aversion
and psychology literature, and is especially consistent with the predictions of
"Prospect Theory" (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Furthermore, we may expect
Congressional representatives to share this type of behavior with regards to
distributive benefits within their district, largely because their prospects for re-
election depend on the continued support of their constituencies. Thus, a
program is likely to engender salience from Congress members if the distributive
benefits that it provides are simultaneously put under threat and sufficiently large
to warrant the attention. (Cohen and Noll 1991) further elaborate on this theme,
characterizing politicians, and Congress-members in particular, as impatient and
risk-averse with regards to R&D programs. Since R&D programs are naturally
risky prospects with uncertain results and payoffs in the long-term, they tend to
be systematically undervalued within the American political system. This suggests
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that programs which can deliver politically-relevant benefits early on are more
likely to be sustained by Congress. The President, on the other hand, has more
latitude to propose large long-term programs. Cohen and Noll note that "A
president must certainly be concerned that programs initiated in one term will not
be carried to conclusion in the next; however, if a program is reasonably
successful, and if expenditures are large enough to cross the threshold of political
significance for a number of legislators, a president can be reasonably confident
that a program will be difficult to kill in subsequent sessions of the legislature."
This argument casts the President in the role of proposing programs while
leaving it to the Congress to sustain these programs, a statement supported by the
game-theoretic analysis of (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988). If, on the other hand,
the President were to try to sustain a program unpopular with Congress, the
program would likely not be successful. Therefore, the distributive goals of
Congress members must be taken into account, even, and perhaps especially,
with Congressional support.
The role of the agency is to ensure that the execution of a program's agenda is
both politically acceptable and technically feasible. This is often accomplished
through agency-industry coalitions wherein much of the agency funding is
allocated to industry contractors, many of whose firms represent large political
constituencies. This phenomenon, often referred to as a "revolving door" or an
"iron triangle", can increase political support within Congress but has the
potential to stifle innovation.
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... Members of ... Government
Congress that provide Agencies that let
funding to... contracts to...
... Industrial Coalitions
that are located in the
electoral districts of...
Figure 9: The "revolving door" or "iron triangle" --
a self-reinforcing feedback mechanism among
members of Congress, Industrial Coalitions and
Executive Branch Agencies (Cohen and Noll
1991).
Given the challenges inherent in generating a program that will gain and maintain
Presidential and Congressional salience, (Cohen and Noll 1991) discusses many
of these issues in significant detail, outlining a set of general characteristics that an
R&D program might posses in order to make it more likely to survive in the
political environment. These characteristics are as follows:
1) "First, the government is more likely to be willing to undertake programs
oriented toward a concentrated industry than a competitive one." (Cohen
and Noll 1991)
This particular characteristic speaks to the relative political ease of associating
with a small, concentrated number of players rather than a larger, more diffuse
interest (Olson 1984). For the purposes of determining the available NASA
budget for the CEV development program, this characteristic speaks to the
Congressional desire to avoid alienating a key constituency. Thus, the concerns of
those groups that are heavily invested in aerospace must be taken into
consideration. For example, this characteristic suggests an advantage to using
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legacy components for the CEV design, if only to maintain the support of the
producers of those components.
2) "Second, R&D projects will be more attractive if they address a broadly
salient national political issue, so that they plausibly constitute an effective
response to a concern of the citizenry at large." (Cohen and Noll 1991)
This characteristic is driven by the Congressional requirement that a coalition be
built in order to achieve action. Although each member of Congress serves a
given fixed constituency, a program is much more likely to receive support from
fellow members if it is viewed as a boon to the nation, rather than simply a
"pork-barrel" for particular districts. It is within this context that the national
pride and prestige elements of human spaceflight become the most important - if
a majority in Congress perceives that the national interest is threatened, more
support may be expected. The Apollo program was the archetype of this modality
(Van Dyke 1964). Nevertheless, such threats are generally short-term in nature
and cannot be expected to provide sustainable results. The drive to accelerate the
CEV represents such a concern, ensuring that the US will not cede superiority in
human spaceflight to other nations.
3) "Third, an R&D program will be more attractive if it has a short time
horizon and does not entail a radical change in the technological base of
an industry." (Cohen and Noll 1991)
This characteristic speaks to the need for Congress members to show results to
their constituents within an election cycle (as little as two years for a US
representative). Furthermore, the industrial base requirement suggests that the
costs of showing these results should be relatively small and should displace the
smallest number of people and equipment possible. In the specific context of the
CEV, this characteristic provides a direct justification for acceleration of the
program while simultaneously maintaining the employment of the existing
aerospace workforce. Once again, legacy technologies are useful in implementing
this directive.
4) "Fourth, the net benefits of a program are likely to play an important role
early in the history of a program, simply because there are only weak
political reasons to undertake a program unless it is economically
attractive." (Cohen and Noll 1991)
The explanation for this characteristic is similar to that of the previous two.
When a program is first proposed, it requires a broad national consensus in order
for it to be approved and then funded. In order for it to avoid cancellation, it
must deliver upon these commitments. Nevertheless, once the program has
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become significantly entrenched, individual members of Congress will be willing
to expend political capital to advocate for its continued existence. This is largely
because it is in their interest to see to their constituents' continued well-being.
There are also valid national reasons to maintain a skilled workforce that can be
mobilized when necessary, but until such a mobilization is required, the benefits
of this maintenance are conferred upon those particular regions of the nation
where the workforce is located, whereas the costs are diffused upon the entire
nation. Programs often take advantage of this characteristic, using what is
referred to as the "camel's nose": An agency may "wedge" a program into the
budget, initially requesting little and then overrunning as the program matures
(Wildavsky 1964).
5) "Fifth, programs that can be fragmented into many, largely independent
components are usually more attractive politically than programs that can
be implemented only if they are centralized." (Cohen and Noll 1991)
The logic underlying this characteristic relates to the observation that support in
Congress is roughly proportional to the number of Congress members willing to
advocate for the program (exceptions to this rule involve the support or
opposition of powerful figures such as chairs of relevant committees, and other
leadership positions). If a significant number of people are employed by a given
program within a given district, the representatives of that district will be willing
to lend their political capital to the cause. A technical system that can be easily
fragmented and spread around the country such that parts of it can be built in
many districts will benefit from this support (Klein 2000). Distributed
management brings similar benefits (Baldwin and Clark 1997). For example, the
Space Shuttle program gained significant support from the Utah delegation in
Congress when Morton Thiokol, a Utah-based company, was selected as the
prime contractor for the Shuttle's Solid Rocket Motors, even though this required
that special additional infrastructure be created to transport these often highly
volatile components to Florida for launch (Hoff 1997). The Space Shuttle and
International Space Station programs have been highly successful in maintaining
Congressional support through distribution. Thus, this characteristic suggests that
the distribution assigned during these programs not be changed, and that existing
infrastructure be utilized to the greatest extent possible. It is generally considered
politically prudent to locate these facilities (and the resulting jobs) in the districts
of powerful members of Congress. Nevertheless, it is not advisable to spread the
program too much. Given that NASA's budget is relatively fixed and incremental,
over-spreading of the program will lead to less spending per district, engendering
less support from each Congress-member. In all, the distributive benefits to be
realized would be too small to cross the threshold of political salience (Kingdon
2003). Furthermore, members of Congress will usually not advocate to increase
44
the number of jobs in their district - rather, they will simply defend the
employment of those already there (Cohen and Noll 1991). In addition,
transportation and communication costs engender technical inefficiency.
are 10 displays the distributive breakdown of the Space Shuttle or
Vigure 1W: Locations ot Space Shuttle contractors
and suppliers. Imagery obtained using Google
Earth (http://earth.google.com). Data obtained
from (Dumoulin 1988).
A plurality of Space Shuttle contracts are located in southern California, generally
considered to be the seat of the American aerospace industry. There are also
other large constituencies that must be taken into account, including the Kennedy
and Johnson Space Centers (in Cape Canaveral, Florida and Houston, Texas,
respectively), Lockheed Martin's Michoud Shuttle External Tank Assembly
Facility in Louisiana, and ATK's Solid Rocket Booster plant in Brigham City,
Utah. These regions represent powerful constituencies as well as a high
concentration of skilled aerospace workers, and are natural considerations for
legacy design. Re-use of the facilities and components mentioned above therefore
has significant political, as well as technical and economic, benefits. It should be
explicitly noted that the political benefits that accrue are only in effect for as long
as the actual legacy systems are still available. For example, a choice to use the
Saturn V rocket within the space exploration architecture would likely be
unsupportable, if only because no Saturn V has been built in over 30 years - the
infrastructure required to do this no longer exists. Similarly, the Apollo TPS
material, Avcoat 5026, is no longer in production, leaving NASA without a
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replacement human-rated ablative TPS material (The Charles Stark Draper
Laboratory Inc. 2005).
6) "Sixth... Proponents of unattractive ongoing projects.. .will often seek
logrolls with advocates of new programs, thereby achieving majority
support and presidential consent for the entire package." (Cohen and
Noll 1991)
This characteristic speaks to the practice of Congressional "logrolling", wherein
one member will support another's agenda in return for a future vote of support.
Linking new programs to old programs allows the implied continuation of one
program by folding it into another. In other words, transitions between programs
should be sufficiently smooth that the end of one program is indistinguishable
from the start of the next (Wildavsky 1964). Use of legacy components on the
CEV enables supporters of the Shuttle and ISS programs to claim a linkage to a
popular Moon/Mars exploration endeavor. At the same time, proponents of this
new exploration program can point to the Shuttle and ISS programs as stepping
stones to their goals. This characteristic therefore acts to minimize technical
change from year to year. Agencies take advantage of this characteristic through
the "bundling" of programs: If an agency's budget is to be cut, agencies may try
to cut the most popular program using a deterrent threat as a political maneuver
(Wildavsky 1964). On the other hand, if cuts are certain, losing the least popular
programs will maintain a coalition (Wildavsky 1964). Thus, the political calculus
of a program manager within an incremental agency depends strongly on how
much support s/he expects the program to receive. It is for this reasons that
agencies maintain strong ties to Congress through liaison offices (Murphy 1972).
One may conclude from the above characteristics that the average incremental
Congress will base its decisions largely upon considerations of cost, schedule,
performance, distributive benefits, and national utility. In particular, we may
distinguish two modes of behavior under which a program might receive support.
The first mode, characterizing the Space Shuttle and International Space Station
programs, is best described as incremental. Under this regime, cost, and to a
lesser extent, schedule, are the main architectural drivers of the program (Maier
and Rechtin 2000). Without a clear national goal to adhere to, Congressional
support for these programs focuses on the distributive benefits that they may
deliver to individual districts (Kingdon 2003). Coalitions are built around
maintaining these entrenched interests, sometimes at the expense of technical
performance metrics (Cohen and Noll 1991). The second mode, characterizing
the Apollo program and other pride and prestige items, is much more
performance-driven (Van Dyke 1964). Although distributive interests do play a
large role in the structuring of the program, the need to achieve high performance
mitigates the resulting inefficiencies somewhat (McDougall 1985). The presence
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of a national goal or national concern helps to focus efforts and can serve to draw
resources to the program, mitigating the budgetary wrangling often associated
with incremental programs. Nevertheless, the nature of national crises is that they
must generally be solved quickly. Thus, this latter mode is likely not sustainable
over a period of time sufficiently long to execute the entire Vision for Space
Exploration or any other sustained directive. Furthermore, national goals are
subject to rapid change and are motivated by such things as economic prosperity
and foreign threats, most of which are rapidly changing and notoriously difficult
to predict. The checks and balances system of the US federal government is
configured to establish oversight by the Congress of large, Presidential
expenditures. Therefore, even in the presence of a long-term goal, one may
expect the eventual modus operandi of federal agency spending to be incremental
and distributive. This pattern is confirmed by NASA history (Jahnige 1968).
Thus, we may think of the budgeting process for NASA as consisting of an
incremental steady-state with occasional transient peaks. As such, we may expect
Congressional valuations of NASA's budgetary request to be different during
these peaks as compared to the incremental steady-state. Table 1 summarizes the
type of behavior that we might expect from Congress, given the environment in
which a budgetary request is made:
Table 1: Expected Congressional budgeting
behavior under periods of incrementalism and
national salience
Incrementalism National Salience
* Slight changes in budgetary * Infrequent larger changes in
allocation from year-to-year budget are possible
* Program is cost-driven - e Program is schedule- and
budget-constraints drive design performance-driven - budget is
and outcome. negotiable to meet objective.
* Coalition-building drives re-use * Drive toward technical
of legacy components - optimality allows development
sometimes at the cost of of new components and
technical efficiency facilities.
The above analysis demonstrates that policy choices do not stand in a vacuum.
Rather, they may be influenced by many factors, including technical choice. Space
systems, and space system engineering, are complex by nature. That complexity is
exacerbated by uncertainty within the political environment. Although some work
has been performed enumerating the effects of policy choices on the technical
architecture, there is no clear framework for how technology affects policy. This
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thesis is aimed at providing such a framework within the context of NASA's
space exploration plans.
Conclusion
The political science literature provides us a sense for what motivates political
change. Whereas technical choice is based upon tractable theory that can be
pursued to a rational and often deterministic end, political choice is marked by an
environment of information scarcity wherein many of the options available to a
decision-maker are not clear. A political decision-maker is thus forced to choose
between a limited number of generally sub-optimal options, often without the
time or ability to investigate the full ramifications of these options in detail. As
such, an entity that can exercise control over the information available to policy
makers can exercise some element of control over the outcomes. In particular,
NASA's technical expertise allows a powerful role in defining options that are to
be presented as policy choices.
It is up to the policy maker to make decisions based upon what information and
options are the most salient to his/her own values. To the policy-maker, agencies,
such as NASA, are tools to be used in implementing a specific policy directive.
Therefore, an agency will receive attention when its work can be used to satisfy a
salient directive, or when its goals are instrumental towards achieving the policy-
maker's goals. Since goals change, an agency cannot always fulfill a salient
concern. During these periods, they are dominated by role-based activity. The
budgeting process, in particular, is dominated by a particular type of role-based
activity often referred to as "incrementalism". Furthermore, there is a
considerable body of space policy literature characterizing NASA as incremental.
As such we can expect NASA's budgeting behavior to be largely driven by the
same forces that drive most incremental agencies. Generally, these act to maintain
the status quo by creating an environment of budgetary scarcity for new projects.
In technical terms, this drives the agency to reduce costs of new programs. Use of
legacy components and technology is one widely-used means of reducing costs
while simultaneously forging a political linkage between new and old programs.
So as to enhance tractability, the remainder of this thesis will focus on the techno-
political effects of legacy component use within the space exploration system
architecture. The next chapter explores the choice to use legacy components to
enable an accelerated deployment of the CEV to LEO. Nevertheless, the larger
techno-political interaction effects of incrementalism remain a rich area for study
and bears further research.
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Chapter 3
TRANSLATING POLICY PREFERENCES TO TECHNICAL
REQUIREMENTS
The previous chapter highlights the political attractiveness of programs that have
short development lifecycles, minimize changes in the nation's industrial and
technological base, and provide distributive benefits to members of Congress and
their constituents. Use of legacy technological components in the design of new
systems is a convenient way of simultaneously meeting all of these criteria. This
chapter traces the effects of these preferences through the architectural domain,
and into technical parameters (see Figure 11).
Political Domain Architectural Domain Technical Domain
Modulation of cost,
schedule, and
Congressional performance Technical
Policy CopnnNational .. ..... om onentPoltcynal Selection
Presidential Poic
Policy
Sensitivity Analysis Technical
Feasibility Studies
Strategic
Analysis System Effects
- - Propagation
Cost Impact
Analysis
Figure 11: This chapter articulates the transition from the political
and architectural domains to the technical domain within the policy-
technology feedback cycle.
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When designing for political sustainability, the architect must always be cognizant
of the effects that decisions made today might have on the future political and
technical environments. This chapter analyzes the effects of using legacy
technology within the specific context of achieving an acceleration of the CEV so
as to return American astronauts to LEO as soon as possible. The effect of this
acceleration on the ability to achieve future lunar objectives is investigated. Three
types of legacy components are identified, each with a specific effect on the cost
of the system under development. Where appropriate, technical analysis is
performed to analyze the feasibility and system effects of a specific legacy
component choice.
CEV Acceleration
On April 14, 2005, Dr. Michael D. Griffin became NASA Administrator.
Responding to Congressional concern that the existing plans to retire the Space
Shuttle by 2010 would leave a four year gap in American access to LEO, Griffin
announced his intention to accelerate the CEV to the extent possible within the
budget constraints imposed.
"Grifin wants tofly the proposed new spacecraft as soon as possible once the
space shuttle fleet is retired in 2010 -- avoiding a four-year gap in which the
United States would have no way to launch astronauts ... Griffin said he
finds that four-year launch gap unacceptable and hopes to have a plan for
closing it ... "CE V needs to be safe, it needs to be simple, it needs to be
soon," Grifin told reporters later in the afternoon.. . "The six-year gap
between the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz mission and the 1981 debut of the shuttle
damaged both the U.S. pace program and the nation", Grifin said. "I don't
want to do it again." (Technology News 2005)
As part of the plan to accelerate the CEV, Griffin commenced the ESAS, aimed
at identifying a candidate architecture that could implement the VSE while
simultaneously satisfying the above directive. So as to enable the successful
construction of a CEV as early as possible, ESAS recommended that CEV
development be divided into "blocks", with Block 1 aimed at servicing the
International Space Station (ISS) in LEO, Block 2 aimed at lunar operations and
Block 3 intended for Mars. These blocks provide convenient benchmarks for
analysis of each legacy component - the effects of using a particular type of
legacy component to accelerate Block 1, for example, will propagate the Blocks 2
and 3. If the use of a given legacy component for Block 1, for example, does not
erode support for the eventual deployment of future blocks, then use of such a
component may be said to be politically sustainable.
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Legag Components as a Means to Accelerate the CE V
As described in Chapter 2, NASA's budget constraints make use of legacy
components an attractive option. From a performance standpoint, use of legacy
components has the potential to reduce development cost, schedule and risk for
the Block 1 vehicle. From the perspective of the political environment, this
behavior will also reduce the pace of the changes in workforce and industrial-base
distribution that can be dangerous to new R&D programs (Cohen and Noll
1991). The intended CEV acceleration makes this option almost indispensable.
Figure 12 traces this decision calculus.
Policy Directives
Presidential directive:
Create a CEV that will
affordably return
astronauts to the ISS,
return to the Moon by
2020 and eventually go
to Mars.
Congressional
directive: Maintain US
pre-eminence in space
by minimizing time
between Shuttle
retirement and CEV
deployment.
Implicit Congressional
directive: Minimize
changes to workforce
and industrial base
_H
Architecture Objectives
cost
Workforce employed
by CEV development
Technical Parameters
use
I,
Figure 12: Impact-path diagram capturing the logic behind the use
of legacy components to accelerate the CEV
The ESAS design relies heavily on legacy components to enable affordability
within the incremental funding regime expected from Congress. In particular,
many Space Shuttle-derived components, such as the Solid Rocket Boosters
(SRBs), External Tank (ET) and Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs) are to be
incorporated into the design. The motivation for these choices is both technical
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and economic. For example, Figure 13, sourced from ESAS, contrasts the
SRB/SSME combination to other possible Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) options.
All of the options under consideration make use of existing systems - the option
of designing a new system was discarded, most likely because of the expense
involved in implementation. The selected option provides adequate lifting
capability for minimal cost at the highest safety rate, the technical metric of the
most interest when designing human launch systems. The choice of SRBs to loft
the CEV will propagate through the system, placing requirements and constraints
upon the design that must be explicitly recognized. For example, the loss of
Challenger was largely due to attempts to launch an SRB under unfavorable
environmental conditions. Nevertheless, the presence of emergent behavior is
hardly restricted to this particular type of launch vehicle - indeed; the previous
successful use of SRBs has built up a record of operation that is largely
responsible for the reliability numbers shown below.
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Figure 13: Comparison of Crew LEO Launch
Systems -- sourced from (NASA 2005)
It is conceivable that a completely redesigned CLV could reduce future recurring
costs (e.g., by obviating the need for transport of SRB segments from Utah to
Cape Canveral via barge from Michoud, Louisiana), although such a redesign
would undoubtedly be more expensive than the legacy CLV choice, likely
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exceeding the President's budget request. This is an example of compromising
current resource constraints to accommodate future needs and it is therefore not
politically sustainable. On the other hand, the CLV as described above is
politically sustainable. A reduction in the CLV up-front development cost
certainly reduces the costs of implementing Block 1 while simultaneously taking
advantage of existing infrastructure that is already in place for the transport of
SRB segments. At the same time, since the CLV will be used throughout the
exploration campaign, the design of Blocks 2 and 3 will benefit from the reduced
cost and increased experience gained from CLV use. The CLV represents a
common component between all CEV blocks and development is therefore
intended to be a one-time expenditure. Furthermore, the CLV requires minimal
change to existing infrastructure, assuring current supporters in government that
their constituents will be able to continue their tasks with minimal interruption.
The continued use of the CLV throughout the multi-decade exploration
campaign strengthens this attribute, allowing CEV supporters the opportunity to
claim security for their constituents for the foreseeable future. Finally, as future
blocks are deployed, the CLV's basic parameters can be expected not to change,
solidifying the benefits described above.
The Lunar Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV), shown in Figure 14, also makes
extensive use of legacy components, including SRBs, an ET and SSMEs. Again,
all alternatives are selected from legacy designs. The selected design is chosen
upon the basis of low cost and high reliability. Conveniently, each of the CLV
and CaLV designs makes use of components that are manufactured in districts
that have traditionally provided strong support for NASA's human spaceflight
programs. This allows the workforce associated with these components to largely
be maintained, preventing large changes that might engender Congressional
opposition.
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Figure 14: Lunar Cargo Launch Comparison --
sourced from (NASA 2005)
Unlike the CLV, the CaLV is intended to be used as part of Block 2 to enable
cargo to be transported to the Moon. As such, some of the components that
make up the CaLV (the ET in particular) will not be used immediately. Instead
they must be stored and maintained until Block 2 is ready for deployment. In
addition to the comparatively small development costs required to convert the
legacy components from their initial form to the new design, a maintenance cost
must be incurred until Block 2 is deployed so as to ensure that the facilities and
workforce expertise making up the specific legacy components are not lost. From
a purely economic perspective, this approach makes sense so long as the costs of
maintenance are less than the costs of development of an entirely new system.
Given the expense required to develop new launch systems, this is likely to hold.
Recalling the definition of political sustainability as an action that allows for
meeting current resource needs without compromising future resource needs, we
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see that the CaLV represents a type of legacy component that is politically
sustainable if its maintenance costs do not prohibit the successful deployment of
Block 1 by overburdening the exploration program budget. As component
maintenance costs increase, the political sustainability of their use decreases.
Taken to an extreme, more money would be spent on maintenance than on the
actual execution of the VSE. The CaLV represents a delayed legacy component -
one that reduces future costs at the expense of present costs. Like the CLV, the
CaLV requires minimal change to existing infrastructure and will be used
throughout the exploration campaign once it is deployed. As such, the political
benefits derived from using these components are considerable. The architect
must therefore trade this political support against increased maintenance
recurring costs, with the understanding that these recurring costs represent an
investment in future capability.
Other opportunities for cost reduction through legacy component use are also
available. For example, (Wooster, Hofstetter et al. 2005) note that a LEO-only
CEV Thermal Protection System based upon reuse of Shuttle TPS components
could enable a successful acceleration of Block 1 while simultaneously allowing
more time for the development of a lunar-capable heat shield. This option is
particularly salient given the fact that no human-rated heat-shield materials
currently exist that can return astronauts safely from the Moon or Mars (Wooster,
Hofstetter et al. 2005). Although NASA has released a Request for Information
(RFI) soliciting non-Shuttle LEO-only TPS concepts, the Shuttle TPS is currently
planned as a baseline (NASA Ames Research Center 2006). Unlike the two
examples provided above, reuse of Shuttle TPS components does not provide a
clear cost reduction for the VSE, since an upgrade to an ablative TPS must
eventually be performed. Using a LEO-only TPS will likely increase total lifecycle
cost since two TPS systems must be designed. Shuttle TPS elements are an
example of a temporary legacy component - one that lowers immediate per annum
cost at the expense of lifecycle cost. This can be achieved by delaying or
stretching development costs for the lunar TPS over multiple years.
Analysis of these different legacy component types yields the following question:
When is it appropriate to use legacy components for design within a techno-
political environment? Solutions depend on the specific subsystem under study,
and require an ability to analyze the political and technical drivers behind a given
decision. This process must begin with a technical feasibility analysis to ensure
that the proposed component may be used (see Figure 15).
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Technical Feasibility Analysis of Shuttle TPS Element Re-Use
Political Domain Architectural Domain Technical Domain
Modulation of cost,
schedule, and
Congressional performance Technical
Policy Component
- National Selection
Policy ZPresidential Policy
Policy
Sensitivity Analysis Technical
Feasibility Studies
Strategic -- ---. - -
Analysis System Effects
-- .Propagation
Cost Impact -
Analysis
Figure 15: Within the technical domain, specific technical
components must be evaluated to determine if their use is physically
feasible.
This section examines the technical feasibility of using Space Shuttle TPS
elements on the heat-shield forebody of a conic CEV, such as shown in Figure
16, for LEO return. In addition, any use of legacy components must take into
account the effects that such a choice will have upon the rest of the space
exploration architecture. Therefore, the technical analysis is supplemented by an
articulation of the subsystems across which system effects might propagate.
Political and organizational factors add to the richness of this analysis and are
therefore also considered.
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Figure 16: A candidate conic CEV shape, identified
by the Draper/MIT CER team as providing a low
maximum heat rate while not compromising
volumetric efficiency. Sourced from (The Charles
Stark Draper Laboratory Inc. 2005)
Any vehicle that is returning to Earth must survive the harsh environment of
atmospheric re-entry. Crewed vehicles, in particular, are subject to a number of
constraints imposed by the requirement to maintain the astronauts on board in
good health while not interfering with the successful operation and return of the
vehicle. The material composition of the TPS is driven, in particular, by the
maximum heat rate that the vehicle will encounter during hypersonic re-entry.
In order to calculate the maximum heat rate encountered during re-entry, we
must first define parameters for the vehicle and the planet to be studied. Table 2
outlines the values of the variables used.
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Table 2: Parameters for initial CEV TPS analysis -
CEV specific values were derived from (The
Charles Stark Draper Laboratory Inc. 2005).
Variable
Name Value Units Notes
S 19.635 m2  TPS surface area
m 10000 kg CEV mass - conservative overestimate
W 98000 N CEV weight
Psi 1.225 kg/m3  Atmospheric density at sea level
a 0.000141 m1 Atmospheric decay constant
Vo 7000 m/s Initial entry velocity from LEO
ho 200000 in Initial altitude
q 9.8 m/s2  Acceleration due to gravity
CEV nose radius of curvature for a 5-meter
R, 5.13 m diameter CEV
Ve 8029 m/s Satellite circular velocity at initial altitude
In order to determine the technical feasibility of using Shuttle legacy TPS
elements on the CEV, we must first determine the maximum heat rate [W/cm]
that the vehicle might face upon re-entry from the Earth's atmosphere. To
provide a lower bound on the heating rates that we might expect the CEV to
encounter, we assume a lifting entry trajectory. This regime is premised on the
assumption that the entry angle into the Earth's atmosphere, y, is negligible with
respect to the horizontal. The following two equations govern the re-entry profile
for the equilibrium glide path (the minimum velocity necessary to maintain lifting
flight) (Hankey 1988):
L =[_V2] -SCL ],2
W2 V| 2W_
p is the instantaneous atmospheric density, L is the lift force acting upon the
vehicle, and V is the instantaneous relative velocity measured with respect to the
moving atmosphere.
D D[ L Dl V2- V
W L _W _ L V| g
D is the drag force acting upon the vehicle and Vis the time-derivative of
velocity.
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The trajectory outlined by these equations is called the "equilibrium glide path",
and constitutes the shallow border of the re-entry corridor (Condon, Tigges et
al.). Attempts to reduce entry drag force, and thus heating rate, beneath the values
derived from these equations would result in a skip out of Earth's atmosphere.
An upper bound estimate may be placed on heating rate through the use of a
ballistic entry profile. Under this regime, we assume that the entry angle, y, is
constant and sufficiently large in magnitude that any lift force acting upon the
body may be neglected. The following equations govern the re-entry profile for
ballistic entries (Hankey 1988):
p
h=VsinYo =Ve f sin yo
- 2Wasin y
where p, the ballistic coefficient, is defined as p = 0
gCDS
V D CDS V2 ICDS V V
g W 2W 2W V
Ballistic re-entry heating is calculated for y = -7 (the largest target entry angle
used during the Apollo missions) and y = -5.460 (congruent with the analysis
performed by (Putnam, Braun et al. pending) in conjunction with the NASA
CE&R study).
These equations, with the initial conditions outlined above, may be used to
determine limiting cases for velocity profiles of a vehicle entering the Earth's
atmosphere. Based upon the results of these analyses, heat rate was calculated
using a Detra-Kemp-Riddell equation for convective heating at the stagnation
point, as follows (Condon, Tigges et al.):
s qconst* (-) )()3i
where the stagnation-point heat rate, qs, is measured in W/cm2, and qconst is a
dimensionless value set equal to 11,030 (Condon, Tigges et al.). Radiative heating
was considered negligible for Earth entry velocities under 9 km/s (Tauber and
Sutton 1991). Using Euler's method, implemented in Microsoft Excel with a
time-step of 0.01 seconds, the maximum stagnation-point heat rate throughout
the flight was determined.
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Maximum heating rates were calculated for a number of L/D and CD
configurations, consistent with a capsule of a shape similar to that of the Apollo
command module. The following figure outlines these values, which were used as
inputs to the above equations.
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Figure 17: Input data for heating rate equations was
sourced from (Condon, Tigges et al.)
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alpha = 100
The following Table 3 gives these values and their associated maximum heat rates
for the range of conditions described above.
Table 3: Maximum heating rates as a function of
angle of attack for an Apollo-style capsule with
parameters listed above
Angle of qs. max [W/cmA2], qsmax [W/cmA2], yo = qs,max [W/cmA2], yo = -
Attack yo=0 0 (Lifting Re- -70 (Ballistic Re- 5.460 (Ballistic Re-
(degrees) L/D CD entry) entry) entry)
5 0.1 1.60 45 72 64
10 0.2 1.50 37 75 66
15 0.3 1.50 31 75 66
20 0.35 1.35 30 79 69
25 0.4 1.30 28 80 71
30 0.5 1.10 28 87 77
35 0.55 1.00 28 91 81
40 0.65 0.85 28 99 87
45 0.7 0.70 29 109 96
50 0.7 0.60 32 118 104
Table 4, sourced from (The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory Inc. 2005), outlines
the maximum heating rate that the Block 1 CEV may be expected to endure:
62
Table 4: Listing of existing Thermal Protection
System materials, courtesy of Bernie Laub, NASA
Ames Research Center (The Charles Stark Draper
Laboratory Inc. 2005).
Carbon Phenolic
(Galileo) Fibercote, Hitco Inc. 1,440 25,000
(Genesis) Technologies, Inc. (layer 112)
PhenCarb Applied Research 320448 ~722
(TRL = 5) Associates
PICA (Stardust) Fiber Materials, Inc. 224 - 321 -3,000
Table 5, sourced from (Ewert, Curry et al.), corroborates this data for Shuttle
reusable surface insulation and provides values for the reinforced carbon-carbon
(RCC) that is used on the Space Shuttle's nose, chin and wing leading edges (the
areas of highest heating).
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4
Table 5: Candidate TPS Materials. Sourced from
(Ewert, Curry et al.)
Service Limits
Density
(g/cm3) qmax (W/cm2) Temperature (K)
Metallics
Rene 41 8.249 9 1145
L-605/Haynes-25 9.130 13 1256
Coated columbium 8.670 33 1589
Tantalum 16.723 69 1922
Titanium multiwall 0.192 3.4 922
Ablators
Silicone elastomers 0.240-0.577 69 <1922
Avco 5026-39 (Apollo) 0.512 432 3033
Phenolic nylon 1.201 432-1109 3033-3839
Carbon phenolic 1.458 >1109 >3839
Carbon-carbon 1.568 69-108 1922-2061
Reusable surface insulation
Rigid 0.144-0.352 28-45 1533-1744
Flexible 0.096-0.160 0.88-12 644-1256
Note that peak heating rates decrease with entry angle. This suggests that, as entry
angle decreases, maximum heating rates will converge to the values predicted by
the lifting-entry equations. For entry angles comparable to the upper limits of
those used in Apollo missions, a ballistic re-entry exceeds the minimum
tolerances of both Shuttle TPS tiles and Shuttle carbon-carbon. This implies that
a shallower entry angle should be used.
For entry angles less than or equal to -5.46 degrees, use of Shuttle TPS elements
is feasible if carbon-carbon is used to supplement the regions of highest heating.
Since the CEV would be operating near the boundary of q,max for carbon-carbon,
and beyond the heat rate tolerances of the tiles, carbon-carbon should be used at
the stagnation point, similar to the nose cap used on the Space Shuttle Orbiter.
The absence of significant heat-rate margin suggests that a Block 1 CEV should
use a shallow entry angle so as to reduce peak heat rate. This, in turn, will
decrease entry corridor width as the vehicle is forced to fly closer to the
equilibrium glide path and the skip-out boundary. This decrease in heat rate
comes at the expense of an increase in total heat load (Condon, Tigges et al.), as
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shown in Figure 18 and Figure 19, requiring an ECLSS system that can tolerate
large heat inputs for longer periods of time during reentry. Alternatively, the
requirement that the heat of atmospheric reentry be dissipated over a longer
period of time requires a thicker, and thus more massive, TPS to insulate
astronauts from the thermal environment.
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Figure 18: Heating-rate time history for a CEV
with a 20-degree angle of attack
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Heat Load History for Selected R.entry Profiles
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Figure 19: Heat load time history for a CEV with a
20-degree angle of attack
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System Effects Propagation Analysis for Shuttle TPS Element Re-Use
This section examines how a decision to use Shuttle TPS elements might
propagate through the CEV system (see Figure 20).
Political Domain Architectural Domain Technical Domain
Modulation of cost
: schedule, and
T echnicalCongressional performance
Policy -a-- ComponentNationa Selection
-1 Policy - r -Presidential - -
PolicyL.
Sensitivity Analysis Technical
Feasibility Studies
Strategic
Analysis System Effects
-. -. Propagation
Cost Impact
Analysis
Figure 20: Once a component's use has been determined technically
feasible, it must be examined for system effects and otherwise
unexpected interactions with the rest of the system.
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Given that LEO entries using Shuttle TPS elements are driven by the
requirement to reduce heat rate, entry angles must be relatively shallow, driving
trajectories closer to the equilibrium glide path. As a result, the vehicle must
spend more time in atmospheric re-entry. Both of these effects cause a buildup of
navigation error and a concomitant reduction in targeting accuracy (Col. Young
2006). This, in turn, negatively impacts landing site targeting accuracy. In the
event of a Pacific Ocean landing, as planned by ESAS for return from ISS, this
leads to a requirement for a larger dispersion of crew retrieval ships, ultimately
increasing operations costs (NASA 2005).
ESAS lunar return utilizes ground landing techniques, taking advantage of the
extra incoming velocity to execute a skip-out maneuver from the Earth's
atmosphere to reduce targeting error. Since Shuttle TPS elements drive entry
trajectories closer to the skip-out boundary, it is worth considering a similar skip-
entry trajectory for LEO return. Compared to lunar return, the difficulty of return
from LEO is increased by the smaller dynamic pressure during re-entry, an
artifact of the smaller LEO re-entry velocity. In this case, a more powerful
reaction control system (RCS) would be required to guide the CEV. This, in
turn, requires that larger propellant and pressure tanks be included within the
CEV structure, further driving up mass and reducing internal volume available
for other items (Col. Young 2006). A trade study must be conducted to
determine the relative costs of transitioning between operations plans for a sea-
landing and a ground landing on one hand, and increasing the capability of the
Block 1 CEV's GN&C and RCS subsystems on the other. In either case, a choice
to use Shuttle TPS elements in the Block 1 CEV will have system effects that
increase costs in other parts of the overall exploration architecture. Figure 21
illustrates the propagation of subsystem requirements resulting from the choice to
use Shuttle TPS elements.
68
I I
Figure 21: Tree diagram depicting the CEV
subsystems that will be affected by a choice to use
Shuffle TPS elernents
Heat rate will be less of a driver for lunar and Mars returns, since human-rated
versions of ablative materials with significantly more margin in heat-rate
tolerance, such as Carbon Phenolic or PICA, will be used (The Charles Stark
Draper Laboratory Inc. 2005) (PICA's tolerance of ~-3000 W/cm2 is twice the
heat rate to be expected from an off-nominal Mars return at an entry angle of -
5.46 degrees (Putnam, Braun et al. pending)). Use of these materials on the Block
1 CEV would allow increased flexibility in the entry trajectory options available to
ISS returns, since heat-rate would cease to be a large driver. On the other hand,
this would delay CEV deployment until after development of human-rated
ablative TPS materials. A system architect must therefore weigh the use of this
particular legacy component, allowing for reductions in schedule, versus
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immediately developing a new ablative TPS material, potentially delaying CEV
deployment but allowing for more freedom in re-entry options and a reduced
transition cost for going to the Moon. In addition, although it is within the range
of technical feasibility to consider using Space Shuttle TPS elements to construct
a LEO-only TPS for the new CEV, the system effects of this choice require that
additional robustness be designed into certain subsystems up-front.
Numerous logistical and organizational concerns are also associated with the use
of Shuttle TPS elements. These tiles and RCC panels are brittle, necessitating a
review of each individual tile after each Shuttle's return (Cooper and Holloway
1981). Such reviews are expensive, partially driving the Shuttle's high workforce
costs. Since the CEV will jettison the heat shield after each use, tile refurbishment
checks will not drive legacy TPS workforce costs (NASA 2005). On the other
hand those elements of the TPS that are to be reused, such as the upper TPS tiles,
will require inspection and refurbishments steps for recertification (Col. Young
2006).
It was a breach in the RCC caused by an impact with a piece of insulating foam
that was the proximate cause of the loss of Columbia upon re-entry (Gehman,
Barry et al. 2003). If RCC and Shuttle tiles are to be used for the Block 1 TPS,
extra care must be taken during transportation of the CEV to ensure that the TPS
is not breached in any way. Such a requirement for added protection prior to
launch is likely to increase the costs of transport and packaging for the CEV,
potentially requiring a custom-designed sling or holder from which the vehicle
could be suspended so as to prevent contact between the TPS and other hard
surfaces (Col. Young 2006). An ablative TPS, on the other hand, is not as brittle
and likely would not require that the CEV receive the same care in transport.
Political & Workforce Implications of CEV TPS Element Re-Use
A savvy system architect must also consider the political implications of using a
particular legacy component. Table 6 lists the various parts that make up the
Space Shuttle Orbiter TPS, and where these parts are made.
70
Table 6: Listing of distributive breakdown of
Orbiter TPS Components. Data sourced from
(Dumoulin 1988)
Orbiter TPS Component Subsystem Contractor (as of City State
1988)
AFRSI quilted fabric Rockwell International Downey CA
Quartz thread J.P. Stevens Co. Los Angeles CA
Inconel 750 wire spring and Santa Fe Textiles Santa Anna CA
fabric sleeving
HRSI and LRSI tiles and Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. Sunnyvale CA
HRSI FRCI-12 tiles Inc.
Alumina mat ICI United States Inc. Washington DE
Nomex felt Albany International Research Co. Dedham MA
AB312 fibers 3M Company St. Paul MN
Macor machinable glass Corning Glass Works Corning NY
ceramic
Velcro hooks and loops Velcro Corp. New York NY
Room-temperature General Electric Waterford NY
vulcanizing adhesive
High-purity silica glass Johns Manville Waterville OH
Fibrous pile-S glass Prodesco Perkasie PA
RCC Vought Corporation Dallas TX
Unlike the SRB and the ET, a decision to cease using these TPS elements on the
CEV would likely not deprive the nation of a core competency, nor would it
leave a large number of people unemployed. This is particularly true given that
NASA plans to use Shuttle TPS materials to shield the CEV upper-body - a part
of the vehicle that is not in the stagnation path and will therefore not bear the
brunt of the heat of re-entry - regardless of the material that is used for the
forebody TPS (NASA 2005). As such, using new ablative TPS materials for the
CEV forebody would only constitute a reduction in demand rather than a
complete cessation of the product line. This is particularly true since the
technology developed for the Orbiter TPS components has produced spin-offs
that create a demand outside of the Space Shuttle program for high-performance
thermal protection materials (e.g., some professional racing cars use Shuttle TPS-
derived materials to insulate drivers from engine heat emissions) (Cooper and
Holloway 1981; NASA 2006). Overall, this suggests that a decision not to use
Shuttle TPS elements on the Block 1 CEV forebody would not meet with as
much political resistance as a decision to stop using SRBs.
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Conclusion
NASA's directive to accelerate the Crew Exploration Vehicle drives the
development of a system architecture that employs a multi-block deployment
strategy and significant re-use of legacy components. The potential cost- and
schedule-savings to be gained from such legacy component use makes their
consideration attractive to the system designer. Nevertheless, care must be taken
to ensure that the unintended system costs of such a choice do not outweigh the
benefits to be gained. The Shuttle TPS trades outlined above provide a
methodology that the system designer might use in approaching this decision. In
particular, we find that use of Shuttle TPS elements is feasible, although it will
require changes that propagate throughout the entire system. For example, use of
these components would necessitate a trade between landing site targeting
accuracy, maximum heat rate endured by the entry vehicle, and total system mass
and volumetric efficiency. This example demonstrates that inclusion of legacy
components come with a cost. Although we leave the task of characterizing this
cost tradeoff to future research, we may apply the same type of thinking to
establish a framework to classify types of legacy components.
The CLV is largely enabled by what we call a Common legacy component.
Common components, such as the SSME and the SRB, may be incorporated
directly into Block 1 of the CEV architecture, and will continue to be used
throughout the product's lifecycle. Since the system was initially designed around
these components, we assume negligible system effects for Common legacy
components. We may therefore model this by a reduction in up-front
development cost. The CaLV, on the other hand, is partially enabled by the ET, a
Delayed legacy component. Delayed components are to be incorporated into
Block 2 or later and therefore must incur some maintenance cost until they are
utilized. We may model this by a recurring maintenance cost followed by a non-
recurring implementation cost. In order for a Delayed legacy component to be
economical, the implementation cost must be less than the cost of building a new
vehicle. A system designer must decide whether the maintenance costs required
for Delayed legacy component use are worth the future savings.
Finally, we identify Shuttle TPS elements as an example of a Temporary legacy
component. These are parts that are to be used in Block One and then replaced
in Block Two by new technologies. We model this by a reduced development
cost for Block One followed by an upgrade cost for Block Two. Thus,
Temporary legacy components are used as a means of reducing the costs of the
current vehicle block by deferring these costs until the next block's development
begins. Table 7 summarizes the three types of legacy components identified:
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Table 7: Summary of the different legacy
component types identified in this chapter.
Legacy Component Effects on Block 1 Effects on Block 2 Upgrade
Type Deployment Cost Cost
Common Reduced cost No effect
Delayed Added maintenance cost Reduced cost
Temporary Reduced cost Added upgrade cost
The three types of legacy components displayed above all have different cost
profiles that will affect the budgetary history, and therefore the political success,
of the CEV acceleration. Thus, through judicious choice of legacy components a
savvy system architect may modulate the per annum, and total lifecycle, costs of
the system under development. This ability is limited by the range of legacy
components available - more options allow increased controllability over the
space of available cost profiles - and by the ability of the architect to understand
how use of a particular component might affect the overall cost profile in an
uncertain future.
The next chapter attempts to characterize the cost tradeoffs dominating each of
the three types of legacy components identified. This information is used to
determine how a decision to accelerate the CEV through the use of legacy
components might affect the overall system and upgrade cost. This will allow for
a comparison of the costs of upgrading to Block 2 at some point in the future vs.
building in a lunar capability now.
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Chapter 4
EVALUATING THE COSTS OF LEGACY COMPONENT USE
The previous chapter identified three separate types of legacy components
differentiated by the architectural blocks in which they are deployed. Each of
these three types may be expected to yield different cost profiles over the lifecycle
of the system. Since design for political sustainability requires an understanding of
how cost might change through time, an understanding of the determinants of
these cost profiles is useful to the system designer. This chapter is aimed at
characterizing these determinants. In so doing, a system architect can translate
technical information into cost parameters more useful to political actors (see
Figure 22).
Political Domain Architectural Domain Technical Domain
Modulation of cost1
.. . . .... ... schedule, and
CongressionalI performance Technical
Policy Component
National Selection
Policy- - -IPresidential P olic
LPolicy
Sensitivity Analysis Technical
Feasibility Studies
Strategic
Analysis System Effects
Propagation
Cost Impact
Analysis
Figure 22: This chapter demonstrates one means of translation from
the technical domain to the architectural domain.
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At the early stages of design, there is very little detailed information that may be
fed into a cost model. Nevertheless, we can make use of the best tools that we
have available to provide rough order of magnitude cost estimates. The
Advanced Missions Cost Model (AMCM), developed at Johnson Space Center,
takes block versioning into account for system-level modules (in this case, the
CEV). The AMCM uses the following equation to derive system cost upon the
basis of past regression data (Guerra and Shishko):
C = a * Qfi * ME * s* 1oC-1900 * BO * 7 D
where C is the total system cost, Q is the quantity of items to be produced (in the
case of development, Q is the number of test articles, mockups, etc.), -M is the
system's dry mass, S is a dimensionless variable reflecting what type of mission is
to be accomplished (for human reentry, S=2.27), IOC is the initial year of
operation, B is the block number, and D is a qualitative assessment of difficulty
ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 in increments of 0.5. In addition, the following
dimensionless parameters take on the values listed below based upon historical
data and regression analyses:
c = 5.64 * 104
p=0.5941
=0.6604
6 = 80.599
, = 3.8085 * 10~"
< = -0.3553
y = 1.5691
The Effects of Development Date on Cost
Figure 23 displays the predicted cost of bringing a CEV online as a function of
initial year of operation and block number. These costs have been normalized
such that the cost of Block 1 CEV in 2012 is set equal to 1.
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Percent Cost Change As a Function of 10C and
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Figure 23: Holding all else equal, Block 2 will
consistently cost less than Block 1, largely due to
experience and learning benefits that are not
directly quanitified in this model.
Holding all else equal, the AMCM predicts that a Block 2 CEV will cost
approximately 0.8 times the cost of a Block 1 CEV. Cost also increases slightly
(~2/6) for each year that the CEV is delayed.
The CER study performed at MIT put a dollar-figure on the overall CEV cost.
The following cost estimation relationship (CER), based on the NASA Air Force
Cost Model (NAFCOM), describes the total CEV development cost as a
function of its dry mass (The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory Inc. 2005):
Cost = 2879.51n M -19120
Since the above CER is a function of mass only, we will assume that Block 1 cost
remains constant regardless of the cost of the Block 2 CEV. Given that we are
examining the relative costs of the two vehicles, this assumption allows us to
place the associated numerical costs within the correct order of magnitude.
Assuming an input dry mass of 6200 kg, we may predict a total CEV
development cost on the order of $6billion (The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory
Inc. 2005). Assuming equal difficulty, and that the Block 1 CEV is to be launched
in 2012 and the Block 2 CEV is launched in 2018, we can expect the Block 2
CEV to cost at most $4.8billion to develop. We assume that the Block 1 CEV
will be ready for launch by 2012, and the Block 2 CEV will be ready for launch by
2018. We also make a preliminary assumption that these blocks both begin
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development in 2006. Given these assumptions and the above results, the cost
per year of the CEV may be estimated through the application of cost-spreading
beta curves. The generic form of such a curve is given by the following equation
(Guerra and Shishko):
Cumulative Cost Fraction
A(10F 2 -20F 3 +10F) + B(10F 3 -20F' +10F 5 ) +5F' -4F 5
Where F is the time fraction and A and B are dimensionless parameters that vary
depending on the type of project. For the purposes of this work, we assume that
A=0 and B=1, typical for a crewed program (Guerra and Shishko). Figure 24
displays the expected cost for both CEV blocks:
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Figure 24: Notional budget sand-chart depicting
expected CEV development cost assuming equal
difficulty between CEV blocks and parallel
development cycles.
The key take-away from this chart is that, for the development of two CEV
blocks of relatively equal difficulty, beginning the development of Block 2 early
can significantly reduce per annum cost in the out-years, even at slight increase to
lifecycle cost. This is particularly relevant to Delayed legacy components - those
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1 Block 2
E Block 1
that must be maintained until they are to be used - since the lag time before
deployment allows an amortization of the development cost. Beginning
development of Block 2 as early as possible would also take advantage of
Wildavsky's strategy for incremental agencies that states that new programs and
old programs should be linked so as to transfer support between the two
(Wildavsky 1964). In the case of the CEV, this would link Congressional support
for a return to LEO with Presidential support for a return to the Moon.
Furthermore, early commencement of Block 2 development would allow the
earlier development of a vested distributive workforce base which may be used to
support the Block 2 CEV once the Block 1 has already been deployed. These
benefits must nevertheless be weighed against the risk that the added annual cost
of developing Block 2 would exceed the amount that Congress might be willing
to provide funding for in a given year.
To illustrate the consequences of this trade, Figure 25 assumes that development
of the Block 2 CEV is started in 2012, when the Block 1 CEV is first launched.
In this case, the development costs of Block 2 are essentially compressed into
half of the development time, decreasing present costs at the expense of the
future. Delay of Block 2 until 2012 could erode Congressional support,
particularly if the skilled workforce associated with a Delayed legacy component
is lost in the interim. Furthermore, Block 2 would have to commence
development at the same time that costs are increasing, potentially eroding
political sustainability. Thus, beginning Block 2 development earlier may be said
to enable political sustainability, presuming that Congressional funding limits are
not exceeded. This particular constraint will be treated in more detail in the
Chapter 5.
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Figure 25: Notional budget sand-chart depicting
expected CEV development cost assuming equal
difficulty between CEV blocks and serial
development cycles.
The Effects of Development Difficulty on Cost
The above cases represent an example of what one might expect for the cost of
the Block 2 CEV, varying only deployment date and holding all else equal. In
practice, not all else is equal. For example, the Block 2 CEV could take advantage
of commonality and existing synergies between the two vehicles so as to reduce
the number of items to be produced, tending to reduce the difficulty, and hence
the cost, of the upgrade. At the same time, the process of rushing a development
schedule increases the difficulty of the development, tending to increase cost. The
remainder of this analysis therefore examines difficulty as a parameter of interest.
The AMCM cost estimation relationship (CER) described above includes a
qualitative measure of "difficulty" that is related to new technology development.
Although only an experienced program designer can evaluate this quantity within
the context of AMCM, (Guerra and Shishko) provides some reference conditions
for an analogous "complexity factor", displayed in Table 8. The conditions
attached to these complexity factors provide some insight into the drivers behind
program difficulty.
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Table 8: Reference Conditions and Values for
Complexity Factors. Sourced from (Guerra and
Shishko).
Condition Complexity Factor
Off-the-shelf, minor modifications 0-0.2
Basic design exists, few technical issues, 20% new 0.3-0.5
Similar design exists, some technical issues, 80% new 0.6-0.9
Requires new design and qualification; needs some technology
development 1.0
Requires new design and qualification; needs some technology
development, multiple contractors 1.1-1.5
Requires new design and qualification, major technology
development 1.6-1.9
Requires new design and qualification, major technology
development, crash schedule 2.0+
Eay Upgrades
Table 8 illustrates the primary benefit to be gained from using legacy
components. Due to pre-existing design, development and qualification, legacy
component use has the potential reduce complexity and therefore, cost, assuming
negligible system effects. Common legacy components are particularly attractive
since they will reduce the complexity of Block 1 without negatively affecting
Block Two complexity. This can therefore reduce overall lifecycle cost. Delayed
legacy components, on the other hand, can reduce Block 2 complexity without
negatively affecting Block 1 complexity. This also has the potential to reduce
lifecycle cost, assuming that the maintenance costs of these components do not
outweigh the later cost savings. Thus, Delayed components are most effective
when the time between Block 1 deployment and Block 2 upgrade is minimal.
Finally, Temporary components have the potential to reduce the complexity of
Block 1 while, in the best case, maintaining the complexity of Block 2. In the
worst case, the complexity of Block 2 increases because of the added effort
required to replace the legacy component. To better understand the effects of
Temporary legacy component use, we must examine what drives complexity
factors.
A decision to accelerate the CEV increases the vehicle's
within the 1.6-1.9 range to the 2.0+ range, largely
schedule". A decision to utilize legacy components on
mitigate this complexity somewhat, particularly if
development items are deferred through the use
components. Depending on the extent to which legacy
complexity factor from
because of the "crash
a Block 1 CEV would
the major technology
of Temporary legacy
technology is used, this
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could reduce the CEV Block 1's complexity significantly, perhaps to as low as the
1.1-1.5 range. We assume this as a lower bound given that political requirements
would likely ensure the existence of multiple contractors. Nevertheless, if a lunar
mission is to be achieved eventually, the technology required for Block 2 lunar
missions must be developed. This suggests that the Block 2 CEV would have a
complexity factor of at least 1.0, since, in the best case, Block 2 would need
"some technology development" for the flight qualification and design of lunar
systems after Block 1 has been flown. For example, a decision to use Shuttle TPS
tiles on Block 1 would still require the development of a new ablative TPS for
Block 2 lunar missions.
Alternatively, one may attempt as much technology development as possible
early-on, thus reducing the complexity of Block 2 while increasing the complexity
of Block 1. In this case, the Block 1 CEV would have a complexity factor of
2.0+, due to the rushed schedule, but the Block 2 upgrade would have an
extremely low complexity factor, likely within the 0.3-0.5 range. This situation
would be congruent with a choice to develop an ablative LEO-only TPS that
allowed for an entry trajectory similar to that encountered by a lunar CEV. Since
the Block 1 to Block 2 TPS upgrade would require minimal development (e.g., a
thickening of a TPS to withstand higher heat loads) the transition from LEO
missions to lunar missions would be relatively easy and low-cost. Taken to an
extreme, this would suggest building a lunar-capable CEV initially and dispensing
with the Block 1 to Block 2 transition. Therefore, there is a tradeoff between
reducing the complexity, and thus the cost, of the CEV up-front and enabling an
easier transition between Block 1 and Block 2 in the future.
The AMCM uses a difficulty metric analogous to complexity factors (Guerra and
Shishko). We therefore apply the same type of logic in order to determine a cost
differential. In particular, if we were to attempt to determine the CEV Block 2
cost, based upon relative difficulty, we could consider the difficuly ratio between
the two systems, which is simply the ratio of the two difficulty factors. In the
limiting case, we assume that the Block 1 CEV has the highest difficulty value
available, 2.5, and that the Block 2 CEV has the lowest difficulty value available,
-2.5. In this case, significant development work would have gone into designing
Block One such that upgrade costs would be minimal. This allows for the
smoothest possible transition between CEV Blocks since the vast majority of the
development work has been performed in advance. Legacy components would
largely be Types One and Two. In this case, the difficulty ratio would be equal to
y 5 = 0.11. In this case, and accounting for the AMCM block factor, the total cost
of the Block 2 upgrade would be approximately 0.09 times the cost of the Block 1
CEV. For example, if we assume a $6billion Block 1, this predicts a Block 2 cost
lower bound of about $500million (in practice, Block 1 would likely be more
expensive due to the additional capability; nevertheless, the cost numbers
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provided are rough order of magnitude, intended only for purposes of
comparison). This cost number would be congruent with the situation described
above in which the vast majority of LEO and lunar technology development
occurs on the Block 1 CEV, with Block 2 incorporating relatively minor
upgrades. For example, if the Block 1 CEV were to use an ablative TPS with
material that could withstand lunar return, the costs of the Block 2 TPS upgrade
would simply be those of testing and certifying a larger heat shield that could
withstand lunar and Martian re-entry parameters. This cost comparison is
captured in Figure 26 and Figure 27. On the other hand, if we were to assume
that the Block 1 CEV and the Block 2 CEV were similar in difficulty, the
situation would be similar to that displayed in Figure 24 and Figure 25.
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Figure 26: Notional budget sand-chart depicting
expected CEV development cost assuming
significantly less difficulty for CEV Block II and
parallel development cycles.
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Figure 27: Notional budget sand-chart depicting
expected CEV development cost assuming
significantly less difficulty for CEV Block I and
serial development cycles.
Dificult Upgrades
Table 8The other extreme, in which the Block 1 CEV development has low
difficulty and the Block 2 CEV development is very difficult, is illustrated below.
This design would make significant use of Common and especially Temporary
legacy components. The strategy in this case would be to reduce the cost of the
Block 1 CEV, ignoring the future costs of the Block 2 CEV upgrade. In this case,
we assume a Block 1 CEV development cost of $500million, with a Block 2
upgrade cost of $6billion (again, these numbers are rough order of magnitude
estimates, intended only to provide extreme examples of how costs might be
spread). Figure 28 displays the per annum cost assuming early commencement of
the CEV Block 2 development.
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Figure 28: Notional budget sand-chart depicting
expected CEV development cost assuming
significantly more difficulty for CEV Block II and
serial development cycles.
This scheme reduces per annum cost by spreading the majority of CEV
development expenditure over 12 years, rather than six years. It is this type of
thinking that motivates the deployment of a Block 1 CEV with reduced capability
to accelerate the return of American astronauts to LEO. Given Congressional
budget caps, this method might be used to reduce per annum cost to the point
where NASA's budget request resides below the incremental level; however,
overuse of this strategy carries with it the risk that Congress might lose interest in
funding the Block 2 CEV before it is deployed. Indeed, each additional year
during which NASA is unable to show Congress a symbol of progress allows the
program's opponents to portray it as a waste of taxpayer resources. Furthermore,
the above chart represents an extreme case that assumes large amounts legacy
component use. It is at this point that limits on technology become important,
since it might not be possible to use legacy components to this degree while still
maintaining a viable vehicle design. Finally, this method stretches Wildavsky's
strategy to the limits of credibility - it might be difficult for NASA to justify
expenditures for a LEO-only Block 1 CEV when the majority of those resources
is in fact going to Block 2 development (Wildavsky 1964). In this case, NASA's
technical expertise and power over information exchange becomes critical.
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Nevertheless, the message remains the same - there is an advantage to using
legacy components to accelerate Block 1 of the CEV if the cost savings in doing
so are diverted to Block 2. Figure 29 displays the situation in which those cost
savings are not taken advantage of.
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Figure 29: Notional budget sand-chart depicting
expected CEV development cost assuming
significantly more difficulty for CEV Block II and
serial development cycles.
In this situation, Block 2 development begins following deployment of Block 1.
As a result, Block 2 costs are compressed into a shorter time scale, creating a
need for a large peak in funding, especially when compared with the costs of
Block 1. This situation is inconsistent with the incremental expectations of
Congress. Therefore, significant advocacy would have to occur in order to obtain
the funding required for Block 2. Since we assume NASA's budget is likely to
remain relatively constant, this suggests that the funding required to carry out
Block 2 development must be taken from another program, potentially alienating
supporters and coalition members. This situation undermines political
sustainability since deferral of costs today increases costs in the future, likely
beyond the point where Congress would be willing to provide support.
Conclusion
Significant uncertainty surrounds the process of estimating the cost of complex
space vehicles. Nevertheless, rough order of magnitude cost modeling techniques
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can provide insight into how annual cost might be modulated by legacy
component use and block deployment date. In particular, up-front development
cost for Block 1 might be reduced by delaying Block 2 development, and by using
legacy components aimed at reducing difficulty. Both of these methods will
increase Block 2 per annum development costs, potentially undermining political
sustainability if Block 2 costs become so high that Congress refuses to provide
funding. This is particularly true if Temporary legacy components are used that
reduce the difficulty of Block 1 development while maintaining, or increasing, the
difficulty of the Block 2 upgrade. On the other hand, Block 2 per annum costs
can be significantly reduced by commencing development earlier. By performing
the most difficult development tasks early, the costs of upgrade can also be
reduced. Thus, overall per annum cost may be modulated by decisions regarding
which components to use and when to use them. The question remains as to how
to best enable political sustainability through cost modulation. In order to answer
this question, the next chapter returns to an analysis of the political environment
in which NASA is situated. In particular, we examine how NASA and Congress
may engage in strategic interactions in such a way as to enable simultaneous
fulfillment of the Presidential Vision for Space Exploration goals and the
Congressional desire to maintain American pre-eminence in human spaceflight.
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Chapter 5
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
The previous chapter outlined some of the determinants of cost for the CEV. In
particular, Temporary legacy components may be used to defer development
expenses, thus reducing Block 1 costs at the expense of the Block 2 upgrade.
Similarly, the Block 2 per annum cost may be reduced by beginning development
earlier, thus increasing costs during the Block 1 development years. Thus, with
careful planning, NASA can modulate its future cost to be consistent with
spending limits. This chapter demonstrates how an agency, by understanding and
modulating its costs, can interact with Congress to create a politically sustainable
program (see Figure 30).
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Modulation of cost
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Congressional performance Technical
Policy ComponentI National 
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Figure 30: This chapter completes the policy-technology feedback
cycle, demonstrating how architectural choices may impact policy
decisions.
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Since NASA, as a Presidential agency, is subject to political forces, particularly
from the Executive Office of the President and from the U.S. Congress, we focus
this chapter on the process by which NASA, acting as a proxy for the President,
and the U.S. Congress interact to arrive at an affordable and politically sustainable
funding level on a repeated yearly basis. Due to the fast-paced nature of events in
the political environment, stakeholders must engage in myopic (short-term)
strategies when defining the nature of their interactions. Nevertheless, long
system lifecycles require that a system be sustained. Thus, non-myopic (long-
term) strategies must also be employed. Similarly, NASA derives utility in both
the myopic and non-myopic regimes. A successful balance between these two,
often competing, needs is required for political sustainability. We construct a
game-theoretic model to inform technical decision-making with regards to how
costs may be spread to enable political sustainability. In order to capture non-
myopic motivations, Brains' Theory of Moves is used to supplement traditional
game theory (Brams 1994). We examine circumstances under which NASA and
Congress may exercise "threat power" to motivate political decision making;
yielding the counter-intuitive result that NASA's high valuation of its human
spaceflight programs, and its concomitant unwillingness to put these under
threat, creates an incentive for Congress to provide NASA less funding than
requested. This dynamic, repeated over several years, is congruent with
incremental funding.
Game Theoretic Analysis
Theory of Moves
In order to examine the interplay of stakeholders using Theory of Moves (TOM),
it is necessary to understand some of TOM's underlying concepts. Threatpower,
defined as "The ability to deter or compel an opponent to take action, at a loss to
both players, given that the threatener will make a net profit in repeated play",
figures prominently in our analysis (Brains 2003). It is worth noting that, using
TOM, repeated play is differently defined than in standard game theory. In
standard game theory, repeated play indicates that each player will literally re-play
a stage game multiple consecutive times with the goal of maximizing total or
average utility. In TOM, repeated play "...means that there is always later play
that enables a threatener to recoup losses it may have incurred earlier in carrying
out threats." (Brams 1994). In effect, a threatener may temporarily accept a loss
so as to improve the final outcome. Practically speaking, this implies that a player
may change position on a normal-form game matrix after the initial move has
been made. Players then alternate, moving sequentially around the matrix, until
one player decides to stop moving thereby ending the game.
In assessing the outcome of each of these models, we will examine two solution
concepts - the Nash Equilibrium, defined as the "profile of strategies such that
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each player's strategy is an optimal response to the other players' strategies", and
the outcome induced by threat power (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991). In the
specific context of the games mentioned below, the Nash Equilibrium can be
identified by examining each player's best response to its opponent's strategy.
The location where the best responses coincide is the Nash Equilibrium. For the
purposes of this model and the situations that it describes, the Nash Equilibrium
represents the myopic outcome - the result that would prevail if either player
were to cease repeating the game in future rounds. This is also the outcome we
could expect if each actor were to forego planning for future funding cycles,
reacting only to the immediate situation at hand. As the name "myopic" suggests,
the Nash Equilibrium represents an outcome taken without extensive foresight
by the players involved. On the other hand, the outcome induced by threat power
represents the non-myopic outcome - the result that would prevail if each player
were to think ahead several steps in an attempt to anticipate and counter the
other player's movements. In this case, the player with threat power is able to
leverage the underlying structure-induced power-dynamics of the game to attain a
favorable outcome. In the specific situations mentioned below, Congressional
threat power represents the budgetary power guaranteed Congress by the checks
and balances inherent in the framing of the constitution. NASA's threat power,
when available, reflects the control that an agency possesses over the flow of
technical/implementation information.
Myopic and non-myopic dynamics may interact in several interesting ways.
Consider the case where the Nash Equilibrium is enforced by threat power. In
this situation, myopic and non-myopic motivations overlap, suggesting that the
structure of the interactions is such that actors perceive it within their long-term
interests to observe their short-term interests. In other words, both players find
the status quo satisfactory. On the other hand, when two outcomes do not
coincide, we have a situation in which at least one player is willing to risk a
possibly inferior outcome in the short-term in order to gain long-term advantage.
In this situation, threat power indicates that one actor is being threatened with the
Nash Equilibrium. The threatener must publicly announce an intention to default
to the Nash Equilibrium if the threatened actor does not cooperate. A credible
threat is therefore one in which the threatened actor concludes that it is in neither
player's long-term interest to engage in myopic strategizing. As such, the threat-
power-induced outcome must be Pareto-superior to the Nash Equilibrium
outcome. In effect, there must be a strong incentive for each player to act in a
non-myopic manner. Furthermore, the benefits of doing so must be common
knowledge. This necessitates that the threatener make the consequences of not
acquiescing common knowledge as well. To the extent that the threatened party
perceives the threat as credible, the non-myopic outcome will result. Finally, we
must consider the situation in which there is no threat power. In this case,
myopic dynamics dominate and the Nash Equilibrium outcome may be expected.
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The Ageng-Congress Game
We model the Congressional budgeting process as a repeated game since it is an
event that recurs every year at roughly the same time. To do so, we first consider
the following simple game description: Every year, Congress must decide on how
it will budget funds to each of the Executive Branch agencies within the Federal
Government. This situation may be modeled as a game played between Congress,
who makes the decision to Save or to Spend and the Agency, following the policy
direction of the President, who must decide to Deliver a Service or Not to Deliver a
Service to Congress, and by extension, the American public. Generally speaking,
the situation may be described with by the normal-form game in Figure 31.
Congress
Spend Save
Deliver (?,?) (?,?)
Not
U (?,?) (?,?)
Deliver
Figure 31: A generic game matrix for the Agency-
Congress game.
We may use a variant of this game to describe the funding process for an
Executive Branch agency after submission of the President's budget request. In
this case, we define the agency in question as NASA providing the service of
flying or not flying the vehicles capable of the next stage of human spaceflight
(e.g., the three Space Shuttles, or the next Block of the CEV). In the case of CEV
development, NASA is providing the service of preparing a new vehicle or new
vehicle block by a predetermined scheduled launch date. For any given service to
be delivered, we are interested in each player's valuation of that service - which
outcomes are preferred to NASA and to Congress? Four combinations of
valuations, shown in Figure 32, are studied in this paper. These scenarios are
linked to the drivers of Congressional valuation identified in Chapter 2. Our
intent in creating these games is to illustrate where NASA can exercise influence
over the budgetary process to enable political sustainability.
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Congressional Valuation
of Human Spaceflight
(High)
Game Two -- Deterrence Game One -- Incrementalism
(Low) _ _ __ NASA's Valuation of
P-Human Spaceflight
(High)
Game Four -- Cessation Game Three -- Uncertainty
(Low)
Figure 32: NASA's and Congress' relative valuations of human-
spaceflight capability define the preference-ordering structure of
each game. The four scenarios considered in this paper correspond
to the four quadrants represented in this diagram.
We call the first scenario the Incrementalism Game because it describes a
situation similar to that prevailing before the loss of the Shuttle Columbia: the
agency's high valuation of the human spaceflight capability provided by the
Shuttle and ISS programs combined with a Congressional incentive to keep costs
low. This contributed to a budgetary environment marked by incremental
budgeting and policy making (Davis, Dempster et al. 1966; McCurdy 1990). More
generally, this game describes any situation wherein the agency or the President
desires funding for something that Congress does not value as highly. In most
years, NASA's activities do not address a salient Congressional concern
(Wildavsky 1964). Thus, Incrementalism represents the typical situation faced by
NASA (McCurdy 1990). As such, it will be the baseline from which the other
games are assessed.
The second scenario, the Deterrence Game, describes a change in preferences
brought about by exogenous events, such as the reorganization of the
Congressional Appropriations Committees, which placed Congress members
with civil space interests in positions of power, and the loss of Columbia - an
event of national importance that raises the prospect that Americans might lose
the dominant position in the human spaceflight arena. These events both
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increased the salience of NASA's activities in Congress. In this situation, NASA
may exercise threat power in order to achieve its desired outcome of obtaining
funding from Congress for the purposes of maintaining human spaceflight
capability. This is the situation in which NASA finds itself now, and it will likely
continue until sustained American presence in LEO is regained, either via a
return to flight for the Shuttle, or more likely via the launch of a CEV that has at
least the capability of going to LEO.
The third scenario, the Uncertainty Game, explores the period of time in between
the Columbia tragedy and the reorganization of the Appropriations Committees,
when it was not clear if Congress would maintain its commitment to human
spaceflight. More generally, this represents a situation in which the President
values a capability that Congress does not. Other examples include President
Reagan's directive to NASA to construct Space Station Freedom in 1985 without
immediate Congressional support. Within the specific context of the CEV block
upgrade, this game would represent the situation wherein NASA requests the
funding for a new capability, such as an upgrade to Block 2, and Congress makes
the determination that such an upgrade is not immediately necessary. In this
situation, NASA's budget request would be sufficiently high that, compared to
other priorities, the benefits delivered to Congress by maintaining human
spaceflight capability do not offset the costs. Under these circumstances, NASA
would be forced to continue to fly without receiving its full funding request.
Finally, the Cessation Game describes a situation wherein the President and
Congress agree that a new capability does not provide value. In this situation,
both parties agree to direct NASA to terminate the program. Such a situation
occurred with the announcement by President George H.W. Bush of the Space
Exploration Initiative (SEI) which, after a cost of over $400 billion was
announced, was dropped by Congress and by the President as too expensive to
be politically sustainable (Ragsdale 1997).
These four games are represented using an instantiation of the Agency-Congress
game mentioned above. In this "NASA-Congress" game, NASA may choose to
Ground or Fly the vehicle providing human spaceflight capability (e.g., the Space
Shuttle, or later, the CEV). In addition, the President makes a yearly budget
request for NASA to Congress. The amount requested is designated BR.
Congress then decides to grant NASA a certain level of funding, F, which may
either be less than or greater than BR. A generic version of the NASA-Congress
game is shown in the normal-form matrix in Figure 33.
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33: A generic instantiation of the NASA-
ess game. F is the funding level granted by
ess and BR is the funding level requested by
esident for NASA.
These games are used to define a framework for determining Congressional
action in response to various NASA activities. In particular, we are interested in
determining how astronaut launch capability to LEO might affect future available
funding. We then examine this choice within the context of political
sustainability.
The Incrementalism Game
NASA's Preferences
We examine the Incrementalism game first since this represents the baseline from
which we measure increases or decreases in the NASA budget. The assumption
underlying each player's preferences in this model dictate the outcomes. These
assumptions are as follows:
1) NASA prefers flying its vehicle to grounding it.
We justify this assumption by noting that many of NASA's activities (such as the
construction of the International Space Station and potential Hubble servicing
missions) require a functional vehicle to be executed. NASA Administrator Dr.
Michael Griffin adds that "...it takes about $4.5 billion to keep the [Space
S]huttle going, whether you fly any flights or not" (2005), a significant portion of
which goes to maintenance costs, workforce salaries, and refurbishment costs on
the ground (Wertz 2000). This statement is reflective of the maintenance of any
of the facilities involved in the human spaceflight enterprise, suggesting that
NASA's budgetary expenditures would not be significantly reduced in the event
that its vehicles become grounded. NASA would not ground its vehicles to save
money.
2) NASA prefers receiving funding to having its funding cut.
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This is largely justified by studies that conclude that an agency's power and
influence is largely related to the size of the budget under its control (ackson
1983).
3) NASA prefers not to terminate a program or upgrade when sufficient
funding is not present.
We justify this last assumption based upon historical observation, wherein NASA
has displayed a "can-do" attitude, perhaps compelling the attempt of complex
undertakings when the resources required to support them are not present.
Indeed, following the Columbia tragedy, NASA was characterized as "an
organization straining to do too much with too little." (Gehman, Barry et al.
2003), indicating that NASA has harbored a preference for action, even in the
absence of sufficient budgetary resources. These assumptions are sufficient to
define a ranked set of preferences for NASA for each of the four possible
outcomes (See Table 9).
Table 9: NASA's baseline preferences make up the
Incrementalism Game, based upon the above
assumptions.
Outcome Preference Ranking
(Ground, Save) 1
(Ground, Spend) 2
(Fly, Save) 3
(Fly, Spend) 4
Congressional Preferences
We must next define the preference ordering structure for Congress, as follows:
1) All else equal, Congress prefers to see NASA's vehicle fly.
Reasons for such a preference are manifold, including, but not limited to, the
national pride and prestige associated with a national spaceflight program, as well
as more locally-oriented interests, such as the revenues and employment
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opportunities that a large federal program can bring to individual Congress
members' districts (Van Dyke 1964). For example,
'The Space Shuttle program occupies 640 facilities, utilizes over 900,000
equipment line items, and directly emplqys over 2,000 civil servants and more
than 15,000 work-year-equivalent prime contractors, with an additional
3,000 people working indirectly on Space Shuttle activities at all NASA
Centers. Thousands more are employed at the subcontractor level in 43 states
across the countj. The total equipment value held by the Program is over $12
billion. The totalfacilities value held by the Program is approximately $5.7
billion (approximately one-third of the value of NASA's entire fadlity
inventory), mostly at the field centers. There are also approximately 1,500
active suppliers and 3,000 - 4,000 qualfied suppliers that directly support
the Space Shuttle program." (Grifin 2005)
Those members of Congress with NASA employees in their district have a
distinct electoral incentive to keep a vehicle flying, namely keeping their
constituents employed and maintaining existing revenue streams in their state.
This is also an incentive for the use of legacy components in a new program.
Other incentives include the achievement of foreign and scientific policy
objectives, as illustrated by the following statement by Senator Barbara Mikulski
(D-MD), Ranking Member of the Senate Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies, which
includes NASA:
'The United States of Ameica should always have its own access to space.
The space station, too, we need to be able to finish that, keep our commitment
to our international partners, and keep it as a premier researchfacility. And,
of course, then there is Hubble. Eveyone knows my position on Hubble.
And I believe it's been the greatest telescope invention since Galileo himself
stood on that rooftop in Florence." (2005)
It is worth noting that the International Space Station and the Hubble Space
Telescope both require additional flights if they are to be completed and repaired,
respectively. As such, Congress members that support these programs would
prefer that the vehicle fly rather than that it be grounded.
2) Given a certain vehicle state (either flying or grounded), Congress
strictly prefers saving its money for other priorities.
In game-theoretic terms, Congress' strategy of saving resources is strictly
dominant. Thus, given that a domestic vehicle (such as the Space Shuttle or the
upcoming CEV) is already flying, Congress will not provide additional funding
for human spaceflight, since the need for human spaceflight is already fulfilled.
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Thus, if NASA attempts a Block 2 CEV upgrade when Congress values a LEO,
rather than a lunar, capability, additional funding is unlikely to be available.
Maslow describes this phenomenon in psychological terms as follows: "...a want
that is satisfied is no longer a want. The organism [in this case, Congress] is
dominated and its behavior organized only by unsatisfied needs. If hunger is
satisfied, it becomes unimportant in the current dynamics of the individual."
(Maslow 1970) Van Dyke elaborates, "[Political figures] tend to speak of those
values or interests that are threatened or that seem to be in need of attention, and
they tend to forget about values and interests that seem to be assured. Sometimes
there has seemed to be complete unawareness of certain values and interests and
complete insensitivity to developing dangers."(Van Dyke 1962) Similarly, given
that the vehicle is grounded, Congress will not expend extra resources if those
resources will not generate human spaceflight capability. Therefore, Congress
always prefers to save its resources if spending them will not alter the outcome.
3) Given a choice, Congress prefers to pay to keep the vehicle flying,
rather than to have it grounded.
We justify this assumption by observing that, following the Challenger and
Columbia tragedies, Congress has continued to provide funding to NASA for
human spaceflight activities, under the assumption that the vehicle would return
to flight. In fact, following the Challenger explosion, NASA requested, and was
provided with, additional funding in order to build a new Shuttle, Endeavour,
demonstrating a willingness on the part of Congress to provide supplemental
funding when human spaceflight capability is endangered. These assumptions are
sufficient to define a ranked set of preferences for Congress for each of the four
possible outcomes (See Table 10).
Table 10: Congressional baseline preferences make
up the Incrementalism Game, based upon the
above assumptions.
Outcome Preference Ranking
(Ground, Save) 1
(Ground, Spend) 2
(Fly, Spend) 3
(Fly, Save) 4
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These preference orderings, taken together, result in the normal-form game
matrix seen in Figure 34.
Congress
Spend F>BR Save F<BR
Fly (4,3)
Ground (2,1)
Figure 34: The normal-form matrix representing
the Incrementalism Game. The Nash Equilibrium
is boxed. The shaded area represents Congress'
compellent threat.
Game Analysis
A brief inspection of the normal-form matrix in Figure 34 yields that the Nash
Equilibrium solution of this game is at (Fly, Save). This conclusion may also be
attained by iterated strict dominance of strategies. In other words, NASA can
always do better by flying than by not flying, and Congress can always do better
by saving money than by spending money. In the short term, NASA will fly its
vehicle and Congress will provide less funding than the President requests. This
outcome is consistent with the situation described in the CAIB report (Gehman,
Barry et al. 2003).
Having defined the game matrix, we now ask whether, given these conditions,
NASA possesses any threat power. Given this payoff matrix, NASA would only
attempt to enforce the (Fly, Spend) outcome, since that is the only outcome that
is better than the Nash equilibrium-enforced status quo. If Congress were to
decide to cut the vehicle's funding below the amount requested by the President,
NASA could exercise this threat by providing a technical argument linking
scarcity of resources to a need to ground its vehicle or otherwise discontinue
service, e.g. for safety reasons. This is classified as a deterrent threat since NASA is
attempting to prevent Congress from taking an action by threatening a retaliation
(Brains 1994). We note that although this threat is real (Congress would suffer a
loss in utility if NASA decided to ground the Shuttle), this threat is not rational,
since NASA would also suffer a reduction in utility. Therefore, this threat is not
credible and NASA does not possess any power to enforce this deterrence.
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Next we explore whether Congress wields any threat power. We begin by noting
that Congress would prefer to enforce the Nash-equilibrium outcome of (Fly,
Save). Congress could employ a threat to prevent NASA from grounding its
vehicle by refusing to move from its position of refusal regardless of NASA's
actions. This type of threat is classified as compellent since Congress is trying to
compel NASA to fly by refusing to move. Here we note that this threat is both
real (since NASA stands to lose from grounding the vehicle) and rational (since
Congress will only reduce its payoffs by deciding to increase funding). Thus
Congress possesses sufficient power to enforce its desired outcome, namely the
Nash Equilibrium outcome, in repeated play, suggesting that the funding shortage
is chronic. We feel that this accurately describes the situation surrounding the
Shuttle Program prior to the Columbia tragedy. Furthermore, this type of behavior
may be said to be typical of any incremental agency politics. Congress, lacking any
direct incentive to increase the budget for human spaceflight, would simply renew
or, at best, incrementally increase the previous year's human spaceflight budget,
effectively causing a reduction in constant-year dollars as inflation decreases
buying power (Davis, Dempster et al. 1966). To make matters worse, as a
reusable vehicle fleet gets older, one can expect its recovery and refurbishment
costs to increase substantially, leading to a tighter budgetary environment (Wertz
2000). These factors, when combined with the chronic cost overruns and rushed
schedule for completion of the International Space Station, contributed to the
organizational difficulties that eventually led to the Challenger and Columbia
tragedies (McCurdy 1990; Gehman, Barry et al. 2003).
This game captures the observation that incrementalism occurs partially because
NASA's needs are not a salient interest to Congress. Possessing limited budgetary
and attentional resources, Congress will focus on other, more salient concerns.
The remaining budget is allocated to NASA and other non-salient agencies in an
incremental fashion. This translates to an under-funding of the President's
request for NASA, particularly in periods of budgetary scarcity. NASA's high
valuation of its own programs ensures that Congress' compellent threat is
credible.
The Deterrence Game
Now consider the case in which NASA no longer subscribes to the "can-do"
attitude. Instead, if NASA is not receiving sufficient funding, it prefers to ground
its vehicle citing technical justifications. For example, NASA may fear for
astronauts' safety in the face of inadequate resources. This change in preferences
could be brought about by a shock, such as the Columbia tragedy, wherein
priorities within the agency and/or the White House are redefined. This may be
justified as a precaution taken during a period of extreme sensitivity to the risks
involved in flying astronauts in a vehicle that is perceived as unsafe. We model
this change by reversing the last of NASA's preferences, stating that:
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* NASA prefers to terminate a program or upgrade when sufficient
funding is not present.
This last assumption works as something of a "wild-card", essentially
guaranteeing that NASA absolutely prefers not to fly its vehicle unless funding is
present. The other assumptions remain. The change in NASA's preferences is
illustrated in Table 11.
Table 11: A change in NASA's preferences from
the baseline yields the Deterrence game.These new
assumptions guarantee that NASA is unwilling to
fly its vehicle unless funding is present.
Outcome Preference Ranking
(Ground, Save) 4-2
(Ground, Spend) 2-3
(Fly, Save) 3-1
(Fly, Spend) 4
These preferences generate the game matrix seen in Figure 35.
Congress
Spend F>BR
Uh
Fly
Ground
Save F<BR
(4,3) (1,4)
(3,1) (2,2)
Figure 35: The normal-form matrix representing
the Deterrence Game. The Nash Equilibrium is
boxed. Arrows represent the deterrent threat that
would be employed by NASA in the event
Congress chooses not to fund.
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Game Analysis
Again, we begin by identifying the Nash Equilibrium of the game. We find that it
is located at the "breakdown outcome" of (Ground, Save), so-called because it is
the state resulting from a breakdown of negotiations between the Congress and
NASA. This implies that, if each player were to act myopically, thinking only of
their near term interests, the human spaceflight program's future would be called
into serious question. In this case, Congress would essentially give up on human
spaceflight as an endeavor that does not deliver sufficient value to fully fund the
President's request, whereas NASA, fearing for astronauts' safety in a scarce
budget environment, would not maintain the vehicle in flight. This is the myopic,
short term outcome. Analyzing this game for threat power yields a different
result. As before, we examine the case where NASA tries to enforce the (Fly,
Spend) outcome using a deterrent threat. Here we note that the threat is real,
since Congress prefers to see the vehicle flying than to see the vehicle grounded,
and the threat is rational, since NASA prefers to ground the vehicle in the case of
no funding. NASA therefore possesses credible deterrent threat power. In
addition, we note that Congress no longer has compellent threat power. Although
Saving is still a dominant strategy for Congress in the traditional game-theoretic
sense, Congress' threat is no longer rational since it can do better by acquiescing
to the President's request for more NASA funding. Thus, while it might seem
that the program is under danger in the short-term, Congress and NASA can
cooperate to provide the funding necessary to ensure safe and successful
operation.
These results highlight the effects that changing one player's preference ordering
may have on both players' threat power, and hence the outcome of the game. In
this case, NASA, in changing its preferences, affects Congress' threat power,
allowing for a funding increase. In other words, Congress' threat in the
Incrementalism Game is rational only because NASA prefers to fly the vehicle in
spite of insufficient funding. This yields the counter-intuitive result that NASA's
high valuation of its own programs allows Congress to under-fund them. Cast
differently, this implies that NASA, as the technical experts evaluating the
feasibility and safety of human spaceflight, might be able to elicit increased
funding for the program if it can be demonstrated that such funding is necessary
to ensure crew safety and vehicle reliability. This highlights the power that NASA
possesses as the sole source of information regarding human spaceflight. This
conclusion is similar to that reached by (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988) who note
that the structure of the President's veto power allows control over the outcome
of the game to the player who values the program less. It will be noted later that
there is a practical limit to how much money Congress might be willing to spend,
even when faced with a deterrent threat.
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We justify the results of this model historically. The following testimony
demonstrates that the selection of NASA Administrator Michael D. Griffin has
effectively acted to change NASA's preferences, whereas the Columbia tragedy
and incipient Shuttle retirement threatens a potential hiatus in human spaceflight:
'NASA's new boss made an impassioned caseyesterday [May 2, 2005] for
speeding up development of a new spacecraft so that the United States will not
lose access to space when the shuttle is retired ... Grifin wants to fly the
proposed new spacecraft as soon as possible once the space shuttle fleet is
retired in 2010 - avoiding afour-year gap in which the United States would
have no way to launch astronauts ... Griffin said he finds that four-year
launch gap unacceptable and hopes to have a plan for closing it by mid-July
... "CE V needs to be safe, it needs to be simple, it needs to be soon," Grfin
told reporters later in the afternoon... "The six-year gap between the 1975
Apollo-SoyuZ mission and the 1981 debut of the shuttle damaged both the
U.S. space program and the nation" Grifin said "I don't want to do it
again." (Technology News 2005)
"The estimated cost of these new vehicles is from $10 billion to $15 billion
through 2015... NASA hopes to pay the tab from its scheduled modest
budget increases and savingfrom falling return toflight costs. But one oficial
says that those return-to-flight costs will climb as high as $7 billion over 5
years-$2 billion more than previous estimated That figure would leave little
room for new ventures, the cost of which have traditionaly been
underestimated" (Lawler 2005)
'Testifying before the House Science Committee Today, Michael Grifin,
[NASA] Administrator.. .said that NASA needs $3-5 billion more than
is currenty budgeted to fund the Space Shuttle through 2010... "(House
Science Committee 2005)
In this situation, a signal is being sent advocating that Congress at least approve,
if not improve upon, NASA's budget for the next years and threatening Congress
with a lapse in human spaceflight capability that, if unchecked and under funded,
could become debilitating or, at worst, permanent. Acceleration of CEV
development, although eliminating this gap, compounds the budget issue, making
the threat more real and more credible to Congress.
Many prominent members of Congress have expressed their support for NASA's
human spaceflight activities, and seemed poised to approve NASA's budget
request. As of June 17, 2005, the House of Representatives supported NASA's
budget request:
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'House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-Texas) today said the Science,
State, Justice and Commerce spending bill, which includes $16.5 billion for
NASA, will continue Congress' work to implement President Bush's bold
new vision for space exploration. The House of Representatives passed the
appropriation bill today by a bpartisan vote of 418- 7.. The funding bill
passed today sets aside $16.5 billion for NASA - $275 million more than
last year's bill and $15 million above the administration's request. In
addition to providing the full request for the Space Shuttle program, this
legislation funds the president's vision for space exploration at $3.1
billion... "The president's vision will be fulfiled, NASA's mission will be
accomplished, and mankind's ancient questions will be answered," DeLay
said. "That's not overconfidence; that's apromise. "" (DeILy 2005)
Fulfillment of this promise began on July 22, 2005, with the passage of a NASA
reauthorization.
'By an overwhelming margin, the U.S. House of Representatives today
passed legislation to reauthorize the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) that was sponsored by Space and Aeronautics
Subcommittee Chairman Ken Calvert (R-CA) and Science Committee
Chairman Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY). The bill, H.R. 3070, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2005, was
adopted by of vote of 383 to 15. [H.R. 3070] allows NASA to proceed
with its plan to retire the Space Shuttle fleet by the end of 2010; and
encourages NASA to launch the Crew Exploration Vehicle (the Shuttle's
replacement) as close to 2010 as possible.. .A manager's amendment offered
by Chairman Boehlert was agreed to by voice vote. In addition to making
technical and clarifing changes, the amendment... Increases the amount of
funding authoriZed to be appropriated for NASA to support the President's
budget request for exploration for fiscal years 2006 and 2007 [and]
expresses the Sense of the Congress that NASA should return the Space
Shuttle to flight as soon as the Administrator determines that it can be
accomplished with an acceptable level of safety"(House Science Committee
2005)
'The Manager's Amendment increases funding for FY06 to $16.9 billion
and elevates FY07 funding to $17.7 billion. This increase restores the full
funding requested by the Administration for Human Exploration... 'I am
pleased with the bpartisan strides that the House Science Committee has
made to work together to achieve the best results for NASA. Such an
inclusive compromise indicates that this county can truly achieve its vision of
space exploration for generations to come,' commented Rep. Sheila Jackson-
Lee (D-TX). "(House Science Committee Democratic Membershp 2005)
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""This Congress recognizes and embraces the importance of NASA's
technological innovation and research, and this reautho*zation provides for
it," DeILay said. "Ultimatey, this bill does one thing: it gives the men and
women of NASA - many of whom I amfortunate enough to represent - the
resources thg need to make their next giant leap"" (DeLay 2005)
In addition, prominent Senators from both political parties have voiced their
support for NASA's human spaceflight activities. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison
(R-TX), a member of the Senate Committee on Appropriations; Subcommittee
on Commerce, Justice and Science, as well as the Chair of the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science and Transportation; Subcommittee on Science and Space,
stated the following in a May 12, 2005 hearing with NASA Administrator Griffin,
effectively belying the reality of NASA's deterrent threat:
"Where I have questions and concerns about NASA, thg revolve around
longer-term impacts to our current investments in human space flight
capabilities. As you know, Mr. Administrator, I am concerned about the
possibiliy of a gap between the planned retirement of the shuttle and the
availabiliy of the replacement crew return vehicle. I think a five-year gap is
unacceptable. I think it is not only a risk to the important scientific research
that we are doing, but it is a securiy risk to our county. And I am pleased
thatyou have shared the same concerns. And I know both the chairman and
the ranking member here have also expressed those concerns." (2005)
In addition, coincident with the passage of H.R. 3070, mentioned above, Senator
Hutchison and her Democratic counterpart, Ranking Member Sen. Bil Nelson of
Florida, submitted an amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill "expressing
the Sense of the Senate regarding the critical nature of human space flight to
America's security" (Hutchison 2005). This amendment includes the following
language:
"(a) FINDINGS.--The Congressfinds that--
(1) human spaceflight preeminence allows the United States to project
leadership around the world and forms an important component of United
States national securiy;
(2) continued development of human spaceflight in low-Earth orbit, on the
Moon, and beond adds to the overall national strategic posture;
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(3) human spacejlight enables continued stewardship of the region between the
earth and the Moon--an area that is critical and of growing national and
international security relevance;
(4) human spaceflight provides unprecedented opportunities for the United
States to lead peaceful and productive international relationships with the
world communig in support of United States securi and geo-political
objectives;
(5) a growing number of nations are pursuing human spaceflight and space-
related capabilities, incuding China and India;
(6) past investments in human spaceflight capabilities represent a national
resource that can be built upon and leveraged for a broad range ofpurposes,
including national and economic securigy; and
(7) the industrial base and capabilities represented by the Space
Transportation System provide a critical dissimilar launch capability for the
nation.
(b) SENSE OF THE SENA T.--It is the sense of the Senate that it
is in the national securi interest of the United States to maintain
unintermpted preeminence in human spaceflight." (United States Senate
2005)
Senator Hutchison explained her reasoning as follows:
'During our consideration of this bill and during hearings, it became clear
that we must think of manned spaceflight in terms of national securio, as well
as science and exploration. For these reasons, I believe it is important that in
the context of this Defense authorization bill, we express the sense of the
Senate that we recognize the important and vital role of human spaceflght in
the furtherance of our national securio interests, and that we reaffirm our
commitment to retaining our Nation's leadership role in the growing
international human spacefight communi of nations... Let us stand united
to recognize the inexorable link and importance of human spaceflight in our
national securi. I hope my colleagues will support this important statement
that says keeping our dominance in space is a matter of national securi for
our country... The idea that we would consider a hiatus in our opportunities
to put humans in space is one that is unacceptable to me and to my ranking
member. We hope the sense-ofthe-Senate amendment will be adopted to
acknowledge and assure that space exploration is shown to be a part of our
national securit interests. It is essential that we not, in any way, ever let our
eye get off that ball, that we must have dominance in space if we are going to
keep our preeminence in national defense." (United States Senate 2005)
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Senator Nelson added:
'"I join with my colleague, the distinguished Senator from Texas, who serves
as the Chair of our Science and Space Subcommittee and of which I have the
privilege of being the ranking member.. .What this amendment does--and I
want to say a word about our two colleagues who lead our Armed Services
Committee who I think will accept this amendment--it simply says: It is the
sense of the Senate that it is in the national interest of the United States to
maintain uninterruptedpreeminence in human spacefhlght. Why? Why are we
saying that? Because we could be in a posture that if the space shuttle is shut
down in 2010, which is the timeline, and if we did not soon thereafter come
with a new vehicle to have human access to space... that if we don't watch out
and we have a hiatus between when we shut down the space shuttle and when
the new vehicleflies, one originally that was planned by NASA to be 4years,
which meant it was going to be 6, 7, or 8 years, then we don't have an
American vehicle to get into space. If that is not bad enough, who knows what
the geopolitics ofplanet Earth is going to be in theyears 2011 to 2018. We
may find that those vehicles we rely on to get today, for example, to the space
station, when we are down with the American vehicle, may be aligned with
somebody else. That is why we want to make sure we have that other vehicle
ready about the time we shut down the space shuttle so we will have human
access to this international space station and reap the benefits, once it isfuly
constructed, of all the experimentation and the processing of materials we can
uniquely do in the micrograviy of Earth's orbit. That is the importance, in
this Senator's mind, of this resolution." (United States Senate 2005)
The three above quotes above refer to space exploration in terms of national
security, prestige and strategic posture. Returning to the analogy provided by
Maslow's hierarchy of needs (see Figure 36), such security considerations take
precedence over all but direct threats to the nation's safety. Although Maslow's
hierarchy was intended to be used to describe individual needs, we feel an
analogous application may be extended to Congress. Thus, the creation of a
linkage between American presence in LEO and national security is a strong
enabler of salience.
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Figure 36: Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs -- Security
Needs are among the most basic, and therefore
command significant salience when threatened.
Such statements reflect the salience of American predominance in human
spaceflight, and a high valuation of human spaceflight on the part of Congress.
Nevertheless, these issues were not salient until the prospect of the loss of human
spaceflight capability became real in the collective minds of Congress members.
The prospect of the loss of human spaceflight capability, highlighted by the loss
of Columbia and by Administrator Griffin's testimony, enables the credibility of
the deterrent threat by focusing Congressional attention on the security
implications of such a loss. This enables a real threat in the prospect of the loss of
American human spaceflight capability. In addition, this threat is credible since
current plans call for the retirement of the Shuttle by 2010. At the same time,
note that there is little, if any, mention of lunar exploration in the above
testimony - rather it is largely concerned with American pre-eminence. Given no
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clear link between Congressional values and lunar capability, it is likely that once
LEO capability is restored, NASA activities will lose salience in Congress.
That certain members of Congress support return to LEO as their primary goal is
supported by the testimony of Senator Hutchison who, in a statement preceding
a floor vote on S. 1281, the Senate version of the NASA reauthorization bill that
"authorizes NASA appropriations in excess of the President's budget request",
publicly recognized the link implied by the Deterrence game (2005). Referencing
the recently-released NASA Exploration Systems Architecture Study, Senator
Hutchison stated that
". .. the results track vey closely to the provisions of S. 1281. The CEV
development would be accelerated to 2012, with the possibility of moving its
operational date to 2011. The key to CEV acceleration is largey a question
of resources, and sufficient funding could enable an even earlier operational
date, possibly closing the potential gap in spaceflight capability altogether."
(2005)
To reinforce this point, it is worth noting that the Senate has considered, but not
passed, legislation that would require that the Shuttle fly until a CEV becomes
available (2005). This language, which seems aimed at reducing the credibility of
NASA's threat, suggests that the Senate is aware of the vulnerability of their
position. A later bill, S. 1281, somewhat diluted this requirement, stating that
"there not be a hiatus between the retirement of the space shuttle orbiters and the
availability of the next generation U.S. human-rated spacecraft", omitting any
specification of how this hiatus would be eliminated, potentially allowing for
commercial or international solutions (2005). A requirement to keep the Shuttle
flying until the CEV is developed could, in principle, allow Congress to continue
behaving in an incremental fashion with regard to human spaceflight, since a
delay in the CEV due to lack of funding would no longer be a present concern.
Indeed, rather than fund the full development of a new vehicle, Congress could
simply divert the funding required to keep the Shuttle flying from the CEV
development funds. Given no mention of lunar capability, it is reasonable to
assume that Congress could also allow funding for a LEO-only CEV, later
behaving in an incremental fashion with regards to providing funding for the
Block 2 upgrade. Either of these situations would be a return to the pre-
Columbia funding paradigm. The testimony of Senator Hutchison acknowledges
a Congressional preference for the use of legacy technology to maintain the status
quo, stating that
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'NASA has begun several efforts in the past decade, to develop a replacement
vehicle for human space flight, with a view to eventually retiring the space
shuttle. Each of them has failed, after considerable expense, to find the
technological breakthrough that was necessary for their success. They were
focused on new technologies, new systems that were laTgey untested, and
unproven. We are now out of time, and can no longer afford the luxuy of
attempting to develop a dramaticall new and diferent human space flght
capabilio." (2005)
As such, NASA's deterrent threat has limitations. To the extent that Congress has
information regarding technically feasible alternative methods to achieving the
goal of returning American astronauts to LEO as soon as possible, NASA can be
directed to implement alternative solutions that do not necessarily allow for an
orderly or easy transition from LEO capability to lunar landing capability. As will
be noted later, these additional dynamics seem to indicate the presence of a
funding limit, beyond which NASA can not reasonably expect to receive funding,
even if employing a deterrent threat. Nevertheless, this limit is influenced by
exogenous factors. For example, the events surrounding the Shuttle Discovery's
return to flight on July 26, 2005, have further served to increase the credibility of
NASA's threat to ground the fleet for technical reasons:
'NASA may never be able to prevent threatening chunks of insulation foam
from breaking off the shuttle'sfuel tank during launch, the ageng's chief said
Thursday, a day after future fJjghts were ordered grounded because of the
problem during Discovery's 4ftoff "We are tying to get it down to the level
that cannot damage the orbiter," NASA administrator Michael Griffin told
NBC's "Today." "We will never be able to get the amount of debris shed by
the tank down to zero," he said. With Discovery in orbit, NASA grounded
all future flights because a large chunk offoam had broken off the external
fuel tank in a hauntingy similar fashion to Columbia's doomed mission."
(Dunn 2005)
Griffin's statements in the above quote publicly reveal that flying the Shuttle
indefinitely is simply not safe. Viewed in this light, a Congressional directive to
keep the Shuttle flying until CEV deployment would appear irresponsible,
particularly in light of another accident. These responses demonstrate the power a
valid technical rationale may wield in strengthening a deterrent threat. Such
events have an impact on Congressional decision-making, further suggesting that
the spending cap representing Congress' maximum willingness to fund
accelerated CEV development is not well-understood and may therefore be
private information, uncovered only on Capitol Hill.
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The above two games capture defining features that drive the interactions
between NASA and Congress. In particular, they illustrate how the presence of a
salient concern to Congress can drive NASA's deterrent threat capability,
affecting a perturbation in the incremental baseline. In order for a concern to be
salient it must be highly valued. At the same time, there must be a real possibility
that might this capability could be lost. Given that NASA or the President also
has a high valuation for this capability, the onus is upon them to implement and
execute its maintenance. If the President has a very high valuation of a program,
s/he may use a veto threat or a high budgetary request to affect change. NASA,
on the other hand, is beholden to the President's request and the amount
awarded by Congress - like any other agency, NASA's sole source of power is in
the information surrounding the details of the technical implementation. If,
Congress has a high valuation for a given program and the Executive Branch
valuations are low, Congress must intervene in order to ensure that the capability
is not lost. This occurs through mechanisms of legislation and resource
allocation. In the specific context of the CEV, this salience is driven by the loss of
Columbia and the concomitant possibility that American human spaceflight
capability may also be lost permanently. In addition, this analysis illustrates the
power of exogenous factors (i.e., those that are beyond players' control, such as
factors that change player preferences) in determining the outcome of a game. As
seen in the first example, the Nash-equilibrium outcome, reinforced by Congress'
threat power, predicted that human spaceflight would be under funded.
Furthermore, TOM predicts that this outcome would occur on a repeated (in this
case, yearly) basis. Following the change in preferences, we note that a new
paradigm has arisen whereby NASA, by acting proactively, may ensure additional
funding for human spaceflight presuming an adequate rationale is presented. This
outcome will be repeated for as long as NASA is willing and able to carry out its
deterrent threat - until the nation's human spaceflight capability in LEO is
restored. This suggests a new set of parameters governing the funding profile
following the change in preferences. In the event that NASA's preferences were
to return to those seen prior to the accident, the outcome would revert back as
well. The Incrementalism game is consistent with McCurdy's identification of
incrementalism as the modus operandi within NASA's internal political structure
(McCurdy 1990). In addition, the presence of short, non-incremental time periods
during which the parameters of the incremental model shift may be interpreted as
"political shocks" or "policy punctuations" in between incremental periods
(Goertz and Diehl 1995; Jones, Baumgartner et al. 1998). It is these non-
incremental transients that allow NASA the ability to exercise deterrence until the
emergence of a new incremental steady state.
From a psychological/informational perspective, NASA is not strictly carrying
out a threat or asking for more funds; rather, the Administrator is providing
testimony reminding Congress of the ill effects resulting from neglect of a highly-
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valued capability. This dynamic is particularly important since the NASA
Administrator is limited to formally requesting the amount put forward in the
President's budget request. Any NASA desire for more funding outside of the
President's request cannot be made through explicit formal channels without the
NASA Administrator facing a situation potentially damaging to his career.
The Uncertaino Game
These two scenarios both assumed that Congress values the capability that NASA
provides, even though it might be unwilling, in some cases, to pay for it. Next, we
consider a different change to the set of preferences defining the Incrementalism
game, this time by Congress. We examine the case wherein Congress prefers
saving money for other endeavors, even at the expense of human spaceflight, to
spending the money required to keep humans in space. We model this change by
reversing the last of Congress' preferences, stating that:
e Given a choice, Congress prefers to ground the vehicle, rather than
paying to keep it flying.
These assumptions are sufficient to define a ranked set of preferences for
Congress for each of the four possible outcomes (See Table 12).
Table 12: A change in Congressional preferences
from the baseline make up the Uncertainty Game.
This guarantees that Congress will not pay to keep
a vehicle flying.
Outcome Preference Ranking
(Ground, Save) 1
(Ground, Spend) -23
(Fly, Spend) -32
(Fly, Save) 4
Such a situation might occur in the circumstance wherein a determination has
been made by Congress that the value delivered in proceeding to the next stage of
the human spaceflight program is simply not sufficiently high to warrant the
funds requested by NASA. Alternatively, Congress might simply decide that
additional human spaceflight activities are no longer within the nation's political
interest. This game is also congruent with the stage of development of a large
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program that has not yet obtained distributive benefits in Congress and requires
sustained Presidential support and a promise of net national benefit to survive
(Cohen and Noll 1991). This situation is described by the game matrix in Figure
37.
Congress
Spend F>BR Save F<BR
Fly (4,2)
Ground (2,1)
Figure 37: The normal-form matrix representing
the Uncertainty Game. The Nash Equilibrium is
boxed. The shaded area represents Congress'
compellent threat power. Note that this game has
the same basic structure as the Incrementalism
game.
Game Analysis
This game assumes, as before, that NASA always has a higher valuation for
providing a service than for terminating it. In this case, we note that Congress
once again has compellent threat power. Note that Congressional compellance is
independent of Congressional preferences. Rather, it is built into the nature of
agency/Congress interactions, reflecting the checks and balances that are central
to the American political system. NASA, lacking a threat that is neither real nor
rational, has no credible threat available, and will simply default to flying its
vehicle with insufficient funding. We also use the game to describe a situation
wherein a LEO-only Block 1 CEV is flying and NASA is attempting to gain
additional budgetary approval for the Block 2 CEV lunar capability upgrade.
Although NASA might have the support of some members of Congress in this
case, there would be no national crisis motivating large spending.
Outcomes here are indistinguishable from those in the Incrementalism game,
suggesting that NASA may not be able to determine the preferences of Congress
if they are receiving insufficient funding. In effect, by refusing to give NASA the
requested funding, Congress sends an ambiguous signal. Figure 38 illustrates the
uncertainty faced by NASA in this situation.
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Congress
Spend F>BR Save F<BR
Fly (
Ground
Figure 38: NASA, lacking complete information
about Congressional preferences, is unable to
distinguish between the Incrementalism game and
the Uncertainty game.
We find an historical analog for this game in the period immediately following the
Columbia tragedy, but before the reorganization of the Congressional
Appropriations Committees. It was only in 2005 that NASA, under the leadership
of newly-appointed Administrator Michael D. Griffin, sent a signal indicating that
long-term human spaceflight capability might be put under threat. The threat
existed before this message was sent, but it was not salient to Congress in 2004.
Indeed, a comparison of NASA's human spaceflight budget for FY2004 awarded
by Congress with the President's request shows that the President's budget
request was under funded by $253 million for human spaceflight alone (2004;
NASA 2005). FY2005 tells a different story; whereas the President requested
$16.2 billion in total for NASA, the Senate awarded $16.4 billion, including $800
million in emergency funds. In contrast, the House of Representatives only
awarded $15.1 billion in total; specifically awarding NASA $959.6 million less
than what had been requested for human spaceflight. This constituted a $23.9
million reduction over the FY2004 appropriation (2004; Reinert 2004). Although
NASA, and by extension, human spaceflight programs, eventually received full
funding, this required extraordinary measures on the parts of President George
W. Bush and House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-TX) (Weldon 2004).
President Bush even went so far as to threaten to veto any budget that was not
congruent with his funding request for NASA, an unprecedented move in space
policy (Reinert 2004). At a time when the Shuttle was grounded and the future of
American human spaceflight was uncertain, these moves by the House of
Representatives called into question Congressional valuation of the human
spaceflight program, suggesting that NASA simply did not have the threat power
necessary to enforce its budget requests. The situation changed in February 2005,
when Leader DeLay orchestrated the reorganization of the House
Appropriations Committee. As a result, responsibility for NASA spending was
shifted from what had been the Veterans' Affairs & Housing and Urban
Development (VA-HUD) subcommittee to the Science, State, Justice and
Commerce Committee (2005). These events are rarities in Congressional
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relations, and may be considered enough of a political shock to have raised the
salience of human spaceflight, just changing Congressional priorities. This, in
turn, yielded Administrator Griffin the opportunity to take advantage of the
newly available threat power coincident with his arrival. It remains to be seen
whether shifting priorities may caused another re-evaluation of the value of
human spaceflight in the long-term. Although NASA's 2005 budget has been
approved under trying Congressional circumstances, including the increased
expense and damage associated with national disasters such as Hurricane Katrina,
newer developments might have caused a return to a lower Congressional
valuation (Hulse 2005; Spires 2005). For example, the resignation of Leader
DeLay was widely viewed as a blow to the space advocacy community's power in
Congress, and might have served to reduce Congressional valuation for human
spaceflight (Berger 2006). Furthermore, there are disagreements within Congress
regarding the utility of providing more funding directly for space exploration. For
example, House Science Committee Chairman Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY)
indicated a strong preference for not providing the funding required to accelerate
the CEV, as follows:
.let me make clear that I do not think it is a pority to addfunding above
the request to the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CE V) program at NASA. I
support the President's Vision for Space Exploration, but I do not see any
great advantage to be gained from launching the CEV in 2012 rather than
2014. Too many other items are ofgreater concern.
'No one has described any actual threat posed by the additional twoyear gap
- even taking into account Chinese space efforts - and the U.S. should be
able to maintain an adequate aerospace workforce as long as it is dear that
work on the CEV is pmceeding according to schedule. Our prioities should
not be skewed by emotional appeals"(House Science Committee 2006).
These statements demonstrate that Congress' valuations, and hence NASA's
threat power, are highly volatile and subject to change. In the absence of a clear
leadership figure, such as DeLay, who could guarantee a given outcome,
determining Congressional valuations requires weighing the preferences of the
House of Representatives, as represented by Chairman Boehlert, against that of
his Senate counterpart, Chairman Ted Stevens (R-AK), of the Senate Commerce,
Science and Transportation Committee. In addition, it remains to be seen
whether or not the new House leadership will take an active stance on space
exploration.
The Cessation Game
Finally, for completeness, we consider the case wherein Congress possesses a low
valuation for the Space Shuttle program and NASA prefers to ground its vehicle
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in the absence of sufficient funding. Preferences for this game are the
superposition of the deviations from the Incrementalism baseline found in the
Deterrence and Uncertainty games. This game is represented by the normal-form
matrix in Figure 39.
Congress
Spend F>BR Save F<BR
Game Analysis
Fly (4,2) (1,4)
Ground (3,1) (2,3)
Figure 39: The normal-form matrix representing,
the Cessation Game. The Nash Equilibrium is
boxed. The lack of long-term dynamics is
suggestive of the terminal nature of these
interactions.
We note that, in this case, neither player possesses threat power of any kind. As a
result, neither player is able to enforce a desired outcome. In addition, the Nash
Equilibrium of this game is also the breakdown state of (Ground, Save). The
intuition for this result is that if neither NASA nor Congress is interested in
maintaining human spaceflight, it will be put on hold. For repeated games, this
implies cancellation or stagnation in the human spaceflight program. An historical
analog of this game is the SEI announced by President George H.W. Bush on the
20t anniversary of the in 1969 Apollo 11 landings. Bush directed NASA to
undertake a program of exploration of the Moon and Mars, similar in many ways
to today's VSE. Nevertheless, the SEI failed to materialize because it swiftly lost
both Congressional and Presidential support (Ragsdale 1997).
Applying the Game-Theoretic Model
Although we have been examining the application of a game-theoretic framework
to the events following the Columbia tragedy, we may expect the same
incremental, structure-induced dynamics to apply to Congress for future funding
cycles. This has implications for the effects of how cost is spread throughout the
program's lifetime. Thus, the following analysis will proceed in two steps. We
begin by analyzing the dynamics surrounding the development of the CEV Block
1. The minimum capability of this CEV is the ability to travel to and from LEO
so that astronauts may service the ISS. On the other extreme, this Block 1 might
be capable of lunar and Mars return. In this latter case, a Block 2 CEV is
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unnecessary. Chapter 4 demonstrated that cost will vary directly with difficulty,
and we assume that a LEO-only CEV is less difficult than a lunar or Mars CEV
to build, and therefore less expensive to implement. Holding all else equal, we can
expect a less-expensive CEV to be more likely to see approval during a given
funding cycle than a more expensive CEV. This is true regardless of
Congressional and NASA valuations for human spaceflight. A lower-cost CEV
will reduce BR, the funding request. This, in turn, increases the likelihood that
BR<P in any given year, suggesting that NASA is more likely to be able to obtain
funding for the CEV Block 1. At the same time, the previous analysis indicated
that NASA is currently playing the Deterrence game, and is likely to be able to do
so until the national crisis that makes it possible has abated. The Congressional
testimony shown above indicates that this crisis is largely driven by the lack of
American access to humans in space. Indeed, until a vehicle is available that can
routinely return American astronauts to LEO, the effects of this crisis are likely to
intensify rather than decrease. This is particularly true if other nations, such as the
China and Russia execute plans to up-scale their activities in LEO, and potentially
on the Moon (2004; 2005; spacedaily 2006). This threatens the American
perception of leadership in human spaceflight (United States Senate 2005). NASA
could therefore provide a technical rationale that serves as a deterrent threat,
justifying a funding request to build a Block 1 CEV that is more than minimally
capable.
Now, consider the situation in which the Block 1, LEO-only CEV has been
launched, human spaceflight capability has been regained, and the President
directs NASA to undertake the construction of Block 2 to proceed to the Moon.
Assuming no change in the general state of space geopolitics by the time of this
occurrence, we may expect that Congress will not perceive a return to the Moon
as a national imperative. We support this conclusion by noting that, up until now,
a return to the Moon has not been a priority within Congress despite previous
Presidential directives (Ragsdale 1997). In addition, we have already noted that
Congressional arguments justifying NASA's salience focus on the LEO capability
provided, rather than the lunar capability. Lacking a national impetus, we may
expect Congressional valuation of lunar capability to be relatively low, particularly
if there are no immediate distributive benefits associated with this part of the
architecture. It is worth noting that if any of the other nations' lunar exploration
plans do get underway, acceleration of Block 2 is likely to become a salient
consideration. This is reflected by the statements of Rep. Ken Calvert, chairman
of the House Science subcommittee on space and aeronautics:
"Right now, we're saying we can't do for 13 years something we've already
done.. .f the Chinese beat us [to the Moon], that's embarrassing. I don't
want to see that happen as an American. I think we ought to maintain our
pre-eminence in outer space. "(Morris 2005)
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Nevertheless, Congress has not taken substantive action on Rep. Calvert's
statements, largely because the tentative human lunar exploration plans of several
nations, including Russia and China, have not materialized in any concrete form
(2004; 2005; spacedaily 2006). This, in turn, suggests that NASA will be unable to
carry out a deterrent threat after the launch of Block 1. If NASA is to successfully
obtain the support of Congress in executing the lunar exploration plans of the
President, the transition costs of moving from Block 1 to Block 2 must be
sufficiently low that they may be supported by incremental funding. This, in turn,
suggests that a Block 1 CEV must be designed so as to minimize the costs of
future transition while not spending so much that Congress is unwilling to pay
up-front. In effect, NASA may take advantage of the current deterrent
environment to design a lunar-capable CEV while the funds are available. Such a
decision would exhibit budgetary political sustainability since it would take
advantage of current resources in such a way as to enable future resource use
without exceeding the amount that Congress has mandated by law in a given year.
It is unclear exactly how much extra Congress might be willing to spend under a
condition of deterrence in any given year. This amount is largely a function of the
quality of negotiations between the Executive and Legislative branches of
government, and of other national directives.
Incomplete Information in Congressional Valuations
Congressional valuations are private information. It is therefore a risky
proposition as to how much additional funding NASA might be able to extract
through a deterrent threat. Suppose that NASA does indeed value human
spaceflight highly. In this case, Congress possesses the threat power to restrict
NASA funding regardless of the Congressional valuation. As Figure 40
demonstrates, without complete information, NASA would be unaware of
Congress' valuation of human spaceflight. NASA takes the risk of attempting to
carry out a non-credible threat that might result in the loss or under-funding of
human spaceflight capability. If, on the other hand, NASA makes a deterrent
threat and fails to enforce it, this may negatively impact NASA's ability to make
future credible threats. This is a structure-induced effect that gives NASA an
incentive to act in accordance with its valuations, reflecting the compellent power
of Congress. NASA's actions send Congress a signal indicating NASA's valuation
of the human spaceflight program - it is very difficult for NASA to keep secrets.
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Congress
Spend F>BR Save F<BR
Fly (4,3) (1,4)
Ground (3,1) *(2,2)
Figure 40: NASA, lacking complete information
about Congressional preferences, risks terminating
human spaceflight capability if a non-credible
deterrent threat is exercised. Here, NASA must
distinguish between the Deterrence game and the
Cessation game.
NASA's power in this scenario stems from its ability to control which technical
options are presented to Congress (Kingdon 2003). In the event of a Deterrence
situation, wherein Congress is concerned with the future of the human
spaceflight program, NASA has the ability to present the CEV solution to this
problem as a multi-block or a single-block architecture. A single-block
architecture may be too expensive, even in a deterrence situation, necessitating a
multi-block architecture. On the other hand, a multi-block architecture will likely
end the deterrence situation, enabling Congress the ability to indefinitely defer the
Block 2 upgrade - unless Block 1 is sufficiently advanced so as to minimize the
upgrade costs. On the other hand, in the absence of a threat from NASA (or
exogenous forces, such as a Presidential veto threat), Congress will seek to reduce
funding, regardless of its valuation of the Shuttle program. Therefore, any signal
sent by Congress is ambiguous, relegating NASA to a position wherein they do
not immediately possess sufficient information to determine whether a deterrent
threat might be successful. Although a methodology for weighing such risks is
left to future research, informal negotiations between agents of the President and
Congress allow for experts in the field to make decisions on the basis of the best
information available to them.
Political Sustainabilio
These results may be used to define a politically sustainable funding level in terms
of the parameters of the game. As we have seen previously, the requested funding
level, BR, serves as the threshold point around which Congress makes its
decision. This value of BR is critical in defining Congress' preferences, assuming
that Congress has a certain private valuation, P, of human spaceflight capability.
As in auction theory, one may think of P as Congress' reservation price, the
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maximum amount that Congress would be willing to pay in order to maintain the
human spaceflight program. If BR<P, that is equivalent to saying that Congress
possesses a high enough valuation of the human spaceflight program to provide
that level of funding under threat. In this case, if NASA knows that Congress'
valuation of the human spaceflight program is high, NASA could reasonably
request more funding (presumably until the funding request exceeds P) by
employing a deterrent threat. NASA, in the role of technical expert, could make a
case for the need for more resources (Kingdon 2003). Conversely, if BR>P, then
Congress' valuation of the Shuttle program is lower than what NASA requests. In
this case, challenging Congress for more funding would, at best, be ineffective
and at worst would lead to the Cessation of the program. Therefore, P is an
upper bound on the amount of funding that NASA might expect to receive in
any given year. In effect, P is the maximum value at which funding may be
sustained, or the politically sustainablefunding level. As mentioned previously, NASA
has imperfect information regarding Congress' valuation. If NASA were able to
correctly elicit the value of P from Congress, this would effectively turn the game
into one of perfect information. Chapter 2 gives us some insight into what might
drive P. As these factors, including geographic distribution and the national mood
surrounding the decision under consideration, increase, so does P. Congress is
not likely to consider NASA's budget alone, but will generally weigh it against
other programs, further complicating matters (Johnson-Freese 2003). Any
calculation of P must take these complicating factors into account. Therefore,
future work in this area should focus upon a method for correctly determining P
on a yearly basis.
The above model demonstrates that a program is unlikely to receive its requested
level of funding if it is perceived that the program can maintain a consistent
pattern of operation without it. In particular, this model examines the situation in
which NASA provides Congress (and by extension, the American people) with
human spaceflight capability. Until that capability is put under threat by
exogenous events, Congress is unlikely to fully support a funding request for
additional human spaceflight capability, and may reallocate funding in the face of
more pressing concerns. The intuition for this conclusion is that Congress,
already receiving LEO human spaceflight capability at a lower funding level,
receives very little added marginal value from the added capability. The lunar
capability requested in a Block 2 upgrade is a Presidential, rather than a
Congressional, directive and may be viewed as extraneous, particularly since the
LEO capability that Congress values is already present in Block 1. In other
words, Congress will not pay more to receive what it is already getting. If,
however, there is a perception that the capability is under threat, Congress will be
willing to provide support up to the point where a determination is made that the
benefits no longer outweigh the costs. Thus, a Block 1 CEV that incorporates
lunar return capability or minimizes upgrade costs in the future might receive
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Congressional support since it simultaneously fulfills Presidential and
Congressional goals. This has implications for an agency's advocacy to Congress:
in order to maintain political sustainability, a successful case must be made on a
yearly basis for why funding is necessary not only to achieve certain objectives,
but to maintain existing capability at a level where they deliver value. If the
objectives of NASA, and hence, the President, do not coincide with those of
Congress, a dearth of funding will result. To the extent that the goals of the two
branches of government coincide, cooperation may occur in such a way as to
allow sufficient funding to solve the problems of both actors.
Just as the previous chapter outlined NASA's ability to modulate its annual
budget through the use of legacy components, this chapter demonstrates how
NASA, or any incremental agency, may take advantage of current events in
formulating its budget request. In particular, when the agency's agenda is salient
to Congress, a deterrent threat might be employed in order to receive more
resources. It is imperative that this threat be backed up by a valid technical
rationale, so as to make the threat credible. This is particularly true since Congress
has become increasingly technically savvy, and thus more able to evaluate the
veracity of NASA's claims Jahnige 1968). Nevertheless, agencies still hold
primary power over the implementation of any directive set forth by Congress or
by the President. It is this power that is the source of the deterrence capability.
Utilizing such a threat is a risky measure that depends on Congressional
willingness to see a capability through to implementation. If Congress does not
highly value the capability being provided, the threat could backfire resulting in
the loss of the capability.
If political sustainability is to be attained, NASA must be able to anticipate and
plan for future budgetary incrementalism. Current testimony indicates that
NASA's recent budgetary increases are driven by Congressional concern over the
American geo-political posture as regards human spaceflight. Barring future
events that might increase the value to Congress of sending Americans to the
Moon, we can expect that NASA funding will return to an incremental steady-
state after NASA has satisfied the current Congressional concern. The primary
way in which this would be accomplished would be the return of astronauts to
LEO by a Block 1 CEV. NASA could mitigate the difficulty of spending large
sums of money during an incremental regime by taking advantage of increased
expenditures during non-incremental periods to increase the CEV's upgradeabiliy
- by reducing future costs, even at increased costs at present. In effect, NASA
would be reducing the difficulty ratio, as identified in Chapter 4, of the Block 2
upgrade. Nevertheless, deterrent threats are risky and should only be used when
deemed absolutely necessary. Congress members are politically savvy, almost by
definition, and will generally not reward a threat that is non-credible. Thus, this
course of action is only politically sustainable if NASA's per annum costs remain
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within the realm of what Congress is willing to pay, and if the capability that is
being provided is something that is truly valued. The art of politics is truly
essential at this stage, since the agency must convincingly craft an argument to
Congress advocating both the technical and political needs for increased funding
- and how future upgradeability is in line with priorities today.
Conclusion
Political sustainability is intimately tied with goals, values and interests. In
particular, a program will be sustained if it is delivering value to the stakeholders
who are contributing the resources necessary to keep it going. Value delivery is a
necessary condition, but it is not a sufficient condition. This is particularly true in
situations in which there are limited budgetary resources and many worthy goals
to address with those resources. Such a situation is encountered on a regular basis
by any number of government programs attempting to obtain federal funding
from a Congress that has several options to choose from with regards to where to
allocate funding. An agency or program, on the other hand, has only one source
of funding, namely Congress. Future work should therefore focus upon
determining the goals and interests of Congress, and indeed, of all stakeholders
involved in the resource allocations process, in order to determine their crucial
needs and how best to fulfill these such that they are willing to contribute
sustained support.
The next chapter examines the conditions under which the parameters outlined
in the above sections may be used to predict outcomes. Changing the values of
these parameters will yield differing strategies that NASA may use in order to
achieve political sustainability.
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Chapter 6
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In illustrating ways in which a technical choice affects a political decision, this
thesis makes a number of assumptions. The purpose of this chapter is to identify
and then challenge the assumptions that are made in each of the previous
chapters. The intention of doing so is to test the sensitivity of the results to these
assumptions, creating a "sensitivity analysis".
Political Domain Architectural Domain Technical Domain
Modulation of cost,
.. schedule, and
Congressional performance Technical
Policy Nat l Component
National Selection
PolicyPresidential -
Policy
Sensitivity Analysis Technical
Feasibility Studies
Strategic - -
Analysis System Effects
-. - - - Propagation
Cost Impact
Analysis
Figure 41: This chapter examines the assumptions underlying each
step made in the previous chapter, exposing areas for future
research.
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As seen in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5, a Congressional drive to ensure the
continuity of American presence in LEO has led to a directive that the CEV be
accelerated, reducing the gap between Shuttle retirement and CEV deployment as
much as possible. An analysis of the strategic drivers underlying Congressional
budgeting reveals NASA's ability to execute a deterrent threat in situations where
Congress has a high valuation of a program that NASA is willing to forego for
technical reasons. Based upon the literature in Chapter 2 and the testimony in
Chapter 5, this thesis assumes that NASA's threat power is currently enabled by
the absence of an American capability to send astronauts to LEO. One may
therefore conclude that Congress' willingness to provide funding above the
incremental level is likely to decrease after the Block 1 CEV has been actively
deployed. In other words, Congress will revert to incremental funding for NASA
after the return of American astronauts to LEO. These conclusions are premised
on the following assumptions:
Assumption #1: Lunar activity does not engender Congressional salience.
In other words, Congress does not consider a return to the Moon enough of a
national priority to spend more than incremental funding for it. For the purposes
of the sensitivity analysis, this thesis examines the consequences of reversing
assumption #1. In this case, some external event would dictate that Congress
consider a return to the Moon a national priority. Such an event would allow
NASA to execute future deterrent threats after the launch of the Block 1 CEV,
and would obviate the need for a return to incremental funding. This would
benefit the exploration architecture in the sense that carrying out the President's
vision of implementing a return to the Moon would now also be a goal fully
shared by Congress. This could occur if another nation credibly stated an
intention to land on the Moon, an outcome that is not entirely unlikely given the
stated goals of China, India, Russia, Japan and the European Union to engage in
more aggressive lunar exploration activity (Briggs 2005; Johnson 2006). A
Chinese landing on the Moon, in particular, would likely draw attention in
Congress, potentially raising lunar return to a salient national issue (People's Daily
Online 2006; Wheeler 2006). Nevertheless, none of these nations have advertised
concrete, actionable plans that involve sending humans to the lunar surface
(Reuters 2006). Such an event, were it to occur, would simply replace one crisis
(lack of LEO capability) with another (competition for lunar access). Any crisis
must eventually be solved and is therefore not sustainable. As such, it can be
expected that funding will eventually return to the incremental level. If NASA is
to engage in a sustained and affordable exploration of the solar system, operation
under conditions of budgetary incrementalism must become the accepted norm.
Assumption #1 is therefore necessary to illustrate how NASA could take
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advantage of current salience to better fulfill the President's directive during
incremental periods.
Assumption #2: National priorities with regards to space exploration are static.
Assumption #2 asserts that there will be no change in national priorities that
divert attention from NASA's exploration objectives. Reversing this assumption
could entail a major national crisis that requires that the resources consumed by
NASA be diverted to other needs. In such a situation, NASA would not be the
only agency targeted. As with any other crisis, such a diversion is difficult to
predict and likely cannot be anticipated. In the wake of requirements for large
expenditures such as caused by national disasters (e.g., Hurricane Katrina) or
military conflicts, NASA's budget has persevered. It is not inconceivable that a
sufficiently large crisis could require that NASA, and other agencies, lose funding.
Generating robustness to this eventuality is likely beyond the control of any
individual government actor and beyond the scope of this thesis.
The presence of a President or set of powerful members of Congress who
oppose the Vision for Space Exploration could also undermine Assumption #2.
It is difficult to predict the outcome of future elections, and how individual
preferences might change. At the same time, nothing succeeds like success. If
NASA is carrying out the VSE in such a way that it is providing tangible signs of
success to the public, future cancellation will be more difficult. Examination of
this assumption therefore reveals an important component to political
sustainability - NASA, like any other political actor, must maintain the support of
its constituency. Chapter 2 illustrated the distributive nature of NASA politics.
Given the embedded infrastructure that already exists for space exploration,
cancellation of the VSE is likely to be inherently difficult, simply because several
members of Congress, and their associated advocacy groups, would create a
vibrant opposition. Any move to cancel the VSE would incur significant political
capital on the part of the executor. In effect, canceling the VSE would be more
trouble than it's worth. At the same time, a specific project manager must be
concerned that their specific project would not be targeted. The strategies
outlined in Chapter 5 are aimed at providing insight into how projects might be
protected. Building a coalition of supporters is necessary to protect a program
from cancellation. It is exactly this sort of behavior that eventually leads to
incrementalism. In a Darwinian analogy, the most successful programs are those
that are able to generate support. Those that do not will be cut, whereas those
that do will eventually find their way to the incremental equilibrium. Any program
that is currently subject to incrementalism has at least enough support to maintain
its current budget at approximately those levels. Even if a new President or some
new members of Congress do not highly value the capability provided by the
agency, there is likely to be continuity of the incremental outcome. This is the
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situation captured by the Uncertainty game in Chapter 5. It is exactly during non-
incremental periods that an agency might risk a large change in budget. This case,
captured by the Cessation game in Chapter 5 is the time when a program may
come under the most scrutiny. If the program fails under scrutiny, as determined
by the powers that be, it risks cancellation. Nevertheless, the dynamics of
Congressional politics are such that if a program is providing some minimal
amount of value, its advocates will ensure that cancellation of that program is
difficult. Given the current distributive benefits associated with human space
exploration, it is unlikely that cancellation of the VSE and associated programs
will be easy. Furthermore, the logic driving political sustainability holds in this
situation. If a program is currently highly valued and able to attain more funding
by means of a deterrent threat, some of that funding must be diverted towards
building the base for future support. In the case of the CEV, this suggests that an
upgrade to lunar capability be easy to attain, thus expanding the base of advocates
who might support future lunar missions. In effect, allowing the Block 2 CEV to
be easily built will provide a reason for those in Congress who support the CEV's
constituents to simultaneously support a lunar exploration program. Assumption
#2 is therefore a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy. Barring a major crisis of the sort
that would necessitate a large redirection of the entire government's resources,
NASA's activities may expect to be supported, at least at the incremental level, by
advocates who derive benefits from these activities. As such, a sudden, large loss
of support is unlikely, although once it does occur it can be debilitating.
Therefore, a program's activities in this regard must be to ensure the satisfaction
of current constituents while always searching for new supporters. A program
manager must be a "policy entrepreneur" (Kingdon 2003).
Assumption #3: NASA does not require more money than the President
requests, and the President requests the amount of money required by NASA.
The game-theoretic model in Chapter 5 does not explicitly include the role of the
Executive Office of the President in generating budgetary policy. Interactions
within the Executive Branch, for example between the Office of Management
and Budget and NASA, are outside of the scope of this thesis, largely because the
results of these negotiations are embargoed to the public. Nevertheless, they
represent an important determinant of NASA's funding situation, and any work
towards characterizing these interactions would constitute an important research
contribution. This thesis assumes that NASA and the President are acting in
concert, largely because NASA is carrying out a Presidential directive. As world
events change and other Presidents are elected, it is certain that the standing of
NASA within the Executive Branch will change. This provides added justification
for engaging in politically sustainable strategies that reduce risks now. Given that
there will be a new president in 2008, and that the new president might not
support the VSE as fully, any actions that could be taken now to reduce the costs
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to future Administrations would help ensure the future survivability of the
program. In the event that NASA attempts to execute a deterrent threat that is
aimed at generating more funding than the president requests, the president
might threaten a veto as a political gesture (e.g., to send a message of fiscal
conservatism). Indeed, it is not uncommon for advocate members of Congress to
question the president's request, inquiring why a certain agency is not receiving
more funding. It is for this reason that the threshold point, BR, is set at the
president's budget request and not higher. Although NASA could, in principle,
ask for more money than the president requested, there is no formal channel for
doing so. The NASA Administrator, as a political appointee of the president, is
expected to support the president's request, even if it comes at the expense of the
agency's well-being. From the perspective of the Executive Branch, the president
is concerned with the well-being of the nation. Agencies are tools to execute the
president's agenda rather than constituencies that must be appeased. As such, the
president's request represents an upper-bound on what an agency may expect to
receive in any given year.
Given the three assumptions outlined above, NASA has the option of exercising
threat power from now until the launch of the Block 1 CEV. After this point,
Congressional compellence will return and NASA will likely revert to an
incrementally-funded agency. The above discussion suggests that NASA could
best implement the president's directive to sustainably and affordably return to
the Moon by utilizing the currently available threat power to obtain funding for a
Block 1 CEV that is more easily upgradeable. Similarly, Block 2 CEV
development should begin as soon as possible, concurrent with Block 1
development, so as to reduce the costs of the upgrade in the future. The aim of
both of these measures is to ensure that the switching costs between the Block 1
and Block 2 CEVs are minimal. This will prevent a peak in funding that would
occur at exactly the time when Congress would be looking to assert more control
over the NASA budget by returning to incrementalism.
Assumption #4: NASA's funding profile will largely be driven by exploration
throughout the VSE.
The above assumption ensures that Congressional preferences regarding NASA
will largely be driven by exploration activities. Given President Bush's articulation
of the Vision for Space Exploration as NASA's primary mission and the
budgetary sand-chart shown in Chapter 2, it is unlikely that NASA's other
programs (namely science and aeronautics), would dominate the budget.
Chapter 4 provides insight into how NASA could modulate its funding profile.
Reasons for doing so include concentrating costs during years where Congress
might be expected to provide more funding. NASA's Advanced Mission Cost
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Model (AMCM) is applied to obtain a rough order of magnitude estimate of how
varying difficulty in component development can affect overall price. In
particular, mission complexity metrics are used to derive an estimate of the
AMCM difficulty ratio. Feeding this into the AMCM provides a rough order of
magnitude cost estimate that can be used for demonstration purposes. The results
provided by the AMCM are normalized to a value provided for the CEV cost by
the NASA Air Force Cost Model (NAFCOM). Finally, the development cost is
spread over several years using standard cost-spreading "beta curves" to obtain
estimates of per annum cost. The AMCM also yields important insight into the
effects of development start date on per annum cost. In particular,
commencement of Block 2 development concurrent with Block 1 can reduce per
annum costs by stretching development out over a longer time period.
The results of this model are subject to the assumptions and limitations that
underlie the AMCM and other regressive cost models. For example, the AMCM
assumes an exponential fit for future missions, based upon previous missions.
NAFCOM assumes similar future costs based on past data. Since these cost
models are intended to span multiple mission types, they may capture only gross
cost differences and cannot be used for fine measurements. Furthermore, the
AMCM relies on the system engineer's subjective evaluation of the difficulty of
constructing a given vehicle. Since difficulty metrics are inherently subjective, the
repeatability of the results of the AMCM cannot be guaranteed. Indeed, most
predictions of this cost model may be debated upon these grounds. To illustrate
this point, one only needs to examine the order of magnitude cost difference
between the extreme cases of difficulty upgrades shown in Chapter 4. It is for this
reason that a range of difficulty ratios are examined, leaving the determination of
this parameter to the mission architect. Despite all of the shortcomings of this,
and other, cost modeling techniques, they are instructive for the initial stages of
comparative conceptual design and thus suited to our purposes. Furthermore,
given that Congress is largely concerned with oversight of NASA at the agency
and program levels (as opposed to the subsystem or component levels), the
rough costing provided by the AMCM is congruent with the fidelity Congress
might expect to encounter.
Application of the AMCM allows us to categorize the cost-spreading allowed
through the modulation of difficulty ratio and Block 2 development start date.
The analysis performed in Chapter 4 identifies the launch of the Block 1 CEV as
the critical date after which this thesis assumes a Congressional return to
incrementalism. Table 13 outlines the effects of variation of these two parameters
on the cost before and after the launch of the Block 1 CEV.
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Table 13: This table shows CEV cost as a function
of difficulty ratio and the commencement of
development. Graphical representations of these
relationships may be found in Chapter 4
Cost before Block 1 Cost after Block 1
Easy upgrade Block 2 Very High Very Low
(difficulty ratio Development
y commences in
2006
Block 2 High Low
Development
commences in
2006
Moderate Block 2 Moderately High Moderately Low
upgrade Development
(difficulty ratio commences in
1) 2006
Block 2 Moderately Low Moderately High
Development
commences in
2006
Difficult Block 2 Low High
upgrade Development
(difficulty ratio commences in
y5) 2006
Block 2 Very Low Very High
Development
commences in
2006
These cost models should not be used for high-fidelity calculations. If at all
possible, costing experts using appropriate modeling techniques should evaluate
the cost differentials of different architectures. The purpose of applying the
AMCM is to illustrate areas where NASA might apply specialized technical
knowledge to exert control over its cost profile. This, in turn, can be used by
experts in the specifics of the political process to evaluate how Congress may
react to changes in per annum cost. As such, the goal of this thesis is to outline a
process rather than a specific methodology.
Thinking of cost as a controllable variable, rather than as a constraint placed by
Congress, is admittedly foreign to the traditional engineering mentality, although
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the field of cost-engineering has begun pioneering efforts in this area.
Nevertheless, it is through the language of funding that agencies and Congress
fundamentally interact (Wildavsky 1964). There are, of course, hard technical
limits on the extent to which costs may be modulated. These limits are dictated
by the particulars of the mission under development. Nevertheless, within these
limits, NASA can influence the per annum and lifecycle costs of its projects.
These considerations drive the next assumption:
Assumption #5: Legacy component use primarily acts to reduce the difficulty
factor of CEV Block construction.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 identify two ways through which NASA can exert some
control over the per annum cost of its projects: modulation of development start
date and use of legacy components. Development start date is restricted by
organizational and logistic factors, such as availability of skilled workforce and
materials to execute a given conceptual design - indeed; generation of a design
concept is itself a major undertaking that, despite its low cost, has a major effect
on the eventual mission architecture. Nevertheless, the earlier a design can be
initiated and its execution can begin, the more opportunity exists for spreading
the cost of the program over multiple years, driving down per annum cost. In
particular, multi-block designs are well-suited to take advantage of this cost-
spreading property since they may show a tangible result in the deployment of
Block 1 while simultaneously improving upon that design for Block 2. The
disadvantages of beginning development and conceptual design early include
lock-in of older technologies and design concepts that might inhibit innovation
on later versions; nevertheless, in the specific case of the CEV's TPS, ablative
materials, which have been available technically feasible since the 1960s, do not
require a major technological breakthrough. Although the trade between
innovation and cost is not explicitly addressed in this thesis, it remains a salient
concern for future designers and likely requires consideration on a case-by-case
basis - some designs will be more given to early commencement while others,
that might entail a high degree of technological uncertainty, should likely be
delayed.
Assumption #6: System effects of legacy component use are negligible.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 explored how technological choice can drive mission
per annum cost. They examined legacy components and how their judicious
choice could be used to shape NASA's cost profile through time. Nevertheless,
significant uncertainty surrounds the system effects of incorporating legacy
components into design. For example, some of the aerospace industry's major
disasters have been caused by indiscriminate component re-use (Leveson 2004).
Such experiences illustrate the need for technical experts with a systems
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perspective who are able to determine which legacy components are appropriate
to use under which circumstances. A generalized framework for performing this
type of analysis is outside of the scope of this thesis, but would constitute a
valuable research contribution. Nevertheless, the savings from appropriate legacy
component re-use cannot be discounted. This analysis assumes that the specific
legacy components used are well-researched and characterized, such that their use
is beneficial. To this end, three types of legacy components may be classified as
follows:
Table 14: Three types of legacy components
identified in Chapter 3.
Legacy Component Effects on Block 1 Effects on Block 2 Upgrade
Type Deployment Cost Cost
Common Reduced cost No effect
Delayed Added maintenance cost Reduced cost
Temporary Reduced cost Added upgrade cost
The selective incorporation of these components allows NASA some measure of
control over its present and future costs, as the situation demands. When
available, Common legacy components are ideal for the purposes of cost
reduction. It is this principle, identified in (Taylor, Broniatowski et al. 2005) and
elaborated upon in (The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory Inc. 2005) that is at the
heart of design for commonality - today's state-of-the-art designs become
tomorrow's legacy components - therefore, design for sustainability requires that
commonality be planned into design. Nevertheless, not all legacy component use
can be anticipated. Some components will not be immediately required for
incorporation, and others will not be useful throughout the entire system's design
lifecycle. Thus, the effects of Delayed and Temporary component use must also
be considered. An analysis of the propagation of system effects of a legacy
component can be instructive in determining how a choice to reuse certain
components might affect overall cost and technical performance.
This thesis explicitly recognizes the linkage between legacy components and
political constituencies. The presence of these advocacy coalitions creates
political, as well as technical, advantages to the use of certain legacy components.
At the same time, it is not always technically advantageous to appease given
constituencies. Conversely, there are often political costs to implementing the
technically optimal solution. Determining a method to trade political costs against
technical costs would constitute an important research contribution to the design
of techno-political systems, such as those constructed by NASA. It is the
intention of this thesis to take the first steps in this direction.
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Conclusion: Tying It All Together
Whereas a program's costs are driven largely by technical and organizational
parameters, Congressional budgeting behavior is driven largely by salience and
political compromise. In the absence of a salient interest, NASA can expect to
receive an incremental funding baseline - approximately equal between years but
for minor stochastic perturbations. On the other hand, periods of non-
incremental behavior arise when outside factors conspire to divert funding to or
from NASA's budget. This upset in the status quo can occur for many, often
unpredictable reasons. Chapter 2 and Chapter 5 link salience of NASA's agenda
to national security in the specific context of returning astronauts to LEO after
the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia. In addition to the motivations of national
pride and prestige associated with having an American presence in LEO, many
members of Congress derive distributive benefits from NASA's human
spaceflight programs. The threat inherent in the prospect of the loss of these
values and associated distributive benefits is sufficient to gain Congressional
attention and, if the testimony of certain members of Congress serves as any
indication, additional funding. Nevertheless, the conditions of Congressional
salience cannot be expected to last forever. If history is any indication, NASA's
budget can be expected to return to an incremental steady-state following the
fulfillment of Congress' desire to return humans to LEO. If NASA is to fulfill the
President's directive to affordably and sustainably explore beyond LEO, funding
must be present to enable a successful CEV upgrade from Block 1 to Block 2.
Given this environmental context, design for ease of upgradeability becomes a
salient concern for NASA. Political sustainability within this context suggests that
NASA should take advantage of the threat power awarded by Congress'
increased salience to build a CEV that may be easily upgraded later in the future.
In the specific example provided by the TPS, NASA should begin development
of the Block 2 TPS now while there is funding available. For example, if it is at all
possible to minimize future funding by including a lunar-capable TPS in a Block
1 CEV, it should be done.
Delaying Block 2 expenditures until Block 1 deployment is not politically
sustainable from a lifecycle perspective. Indeed, if the costs of upgrade from
Block 1 to Block 2 are too high, the deployment of a lunar-capable CEV will be
delayed, and possibly cancelled, in the face of more pressing national priorities.
Thus, acceleration of the CEV should be undertaken with utmost care to ensure
that the means by which this acceleration is implemented do not undermine the
Vision for Space Exploration. This dynamic illustrates the differing preferences
of Congress and the President. To the extent that Presidential and Congressional
goals are in alignment, one may expect definite action accompanied by the
funding required to carry it out. It is therefore unlikely that the Block 1 CEV will
be cancelled or significantly delayed. Nevertheless, if the Presidential goal of lunar
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exploration is to be carried out, NASA must take advantage of the current
political environment to design a CEV that does not inspire Congressional
ambivalence by exceeding future funding expectations. This will more easily
enable a sustainable lunar exploration by helping to keep future development
costs for the CEV under the incremental level enforced by Congress-NASA
power dynamics.
The conclusions of this thesis are based upon many assumptions regarding cost-
spreading, Congressional valuations and the feasibility of using legacy
components to reduce cost. The purpose of this chapter in explicitly recognizing
these assumptions is to examine how the results of this analysis might change in
response to perturbations. This analysis was conducted in reverse, exploring first
the effects of varying assumptions about NASA/Congress interactions. Varying
our costing assumptions might propagate in such a way as to cause changes in
these interactions. Finally, the costing assumptions might be affected by changes
in the assumptions underlying our technical parameters, such as system effects. In
so doing, a set of possible scenarios that NASA and Congress might face in the
coming years was outlined.
Political sustainability on the part of NASA requires a constant attention to the
details of technical design and political choice. Although it might also seem to
require a prescience that extends over several years, general principles can apply
to how systems are developed in a politically sustainable fashion. In particular, the
presence of events that raise an agency's national salience allows that agency an
opportunity to increase expenditures for the purposes of reducing future costs.
So as to maintain credibility, these expenditures must be associated with the goals
of Congress. Nevertheless, NASA's ability to control design implementation
allows for the selection of a design that can simultaneously satisfy Congressional
directives while enabling ease of future execution of the President's VSE.
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Chapter 7
THESIS CONTRIBUTIONS
This thesis outlines a methodology by which a system architect can model
interactions between the political and technical realms within a techno-political
system. In particular, we focused on the Congresssional directive to accelerate the
CEV, and how implementation of this directive might interact with the
Presidential goals of returning to the Moon before 2020. In so doing, this thesis
proposes a definition for political sustainability, arguing that NASA, when
designing systems to fulfill the directives of the President, must take into account
future funding cycles, how the cost of these systems might evolve through time,
and how NASA's budgetary profile might change in response to fulfillment of
Presidential directives. Figure 42 captures these dynamics graphically.
cal Domain Architectural Domain Technical Domain
Figure 42: The full Policy-Technology Feedback Cycle for Executive
Branch Agencies.
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Chapter 1, the introduction, provides a historical motivation and context for this
work, introduces and defines political sustainability, and provides a brief overview
of the literature linking political directives to technical choice.
Chapter 2 extends this literature review into the political sciences, approaching
the problem from the other direction. Specific attributes and characteristics of
agency-Congress relations are identified, with the intention of illustrating what
drives budgetary policymaking. The space policy literature is then drawn upon to
link this theoretical work to NASA's specific case. In particular, NASA is
identified as an incremental agency, undergoing incremental changes in funding.
Strategies used by incremental agencies are identified, yielding insight into what
drives Congressional valuations of an agency's agenda. Finally, two funding
regimes are identified for an agency - namely, the incremental regime wherein
programs must compete with one another for barely sufficient funding in a zero-
sum environment, and the national salience regime wherein specific programs are
identified as fulfilling an important or salient value to the nation and are therefore
accelerated and grown. This lasts until the salient problem is solved, after which
point the program is either discontinued or returned to an incremental funding
level.
Chapter 3 serves as the technical analysis of this report, identifying three types of
legacy components and how they might impact overall cost. In particular,
Common components reduce total cost, Delayed components reduce future
costs at the expense of up-front maintenance, and Temporary components
reduce current costs, pushing the costs of component upgrades into the future.
This chapter focuses specifically on Shuttle TPS elements as an example of a
Temporary legacy component, first probing the technical feasibility of their use,
and then exploring the possible system effects that might arise from component
reuse.
Chapter 4 uses standard cost-estimation techniques to illustrate how per annum
costs might be spread across the development lifecycle of the first two CEV
Blocks. NASA may modulate these costs by varying development start date and
development "difficulty", which is linked in part to the amount of new
technology to be developed and tested. As such, the judicious use of legacy
components may modulate difficulty, allowing NASA to trace impacts on cost.
Given the three types of components identified in the Chapter 3, this model may
be used to determine when it may or may not be appropriate to design new
components as opposed to re-using old ones. The results of this chapter are
intended to be notional; illustrating that cost is subject to some measure of
control through the variation of schedule and legacy component use. As such,
NASA might modulate its funding profile so as to be congruent with
Congressional valuations.
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Chapter 5 presents a game-theoretic framework, based upon the Theory of
Moves, which is aimed at outlining the interactions between agencies and
Congress. In particular, this thesis identifies four generic types of interactions
based upon the valuations held by the Executive and Legislative Branches of a
particular program. We see that the structure-induced "threat power" of each
Branch is affected by the preferences of both actor. The four situations identified
are represented by four games. The Incrementalism game reflects the standard
situation found in agency-Congress relations in which an agency's high valuation
of a program allows Congress the ability to provide incremental funding - the
agency will see to it that that program continues to exist, cutting less important
programs if necessary. This situation is duplicated when Congress does not have
a high valuation of that program, a situation reflected by the Uncertainty game.
When an agency possesses a low valuation of a program that Congress values
highly, the agency can successfully execute larger funding requests through the
use of a "deterrent threat" - a situation wherein the agency explicitly states that
without the funding, the program cannot be executed. The agency can do this
credibly because of the technical implementation expertise that is held within that
organization. This game is therefore called the Deterrence game. If both branches
of government have a low valuation of a specific program, that program will be
cancelled, a situation reflected by the Cessation game. This final situation also
serves as an example of what might happen if an agency loses its credibility by
overstating its budget request. The framework provided by these games illustrates
how NASA might want to structure its funding profile in any given year. In the
event that NASA encounters a period of national salience, the Deterrence game
predicts that more funding could be available if it can be justified. On the other
hand, in incremental periods, the Incrementalism game suggests that NASA
should keep a low profile. Given that national salience is driven by exogenous
political events, if one can identify the source of that event, one can anticipate a
return to incremental funding. As such, the politically sustainable strategy
suggests that the agency should design for upgradeability during periods of
national salience - when funding is available - so that when funding is less
prevalent, execution of the President's goals can continue with minimal
intervention necessary from Congress. This represents a win-win situation for all
parties, since, during periods of incrementalism, the President is accomplishing a
stated goal, and Congress-members can show national and distributive results to
their constituents without breaking the bank. During periods of national salience,
Congress has less need to justify expenditures, since these are in line with national
priorities, and therefore constitute both a solution to an existing problem and an
investment in the nation's future.
Finally, Chapter 6 provides an overview of each of the preceding chapters,
systematically identifying and challenging the assumptions in these chapters. In so
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doing, areas for future work that might ameliorate the limitations of this
framework are suggested. Furthermore, this chapter highlights the role of experts
in the design and political processes, including lawyers who must interpret
Congressional legislation, political appointees who receive direction for the
agency from the President, systems engineers who oversee conceptual design,
technical experts, who oversee detailed design, cost engineers and economists
who are responsible for performing cost analyses and estimation, and legislative
affairs personnel, who are responsible for representing the agency to Congress.
The role of system architect is to serve as interlocutor between these experts, and
to pool their expertise in such a way as to forge a coherent strategy that will
enable the long-term political sustainability of the President's directive.
There are four major contributions of this thesis:
1. The framework provided by the policy-technology feedback loop, which
illustrates that a techno-political system is engaged in constant give and
take between the political and technical realms. This framework may be
used by a system architect to trace the effects of a given political choice
on a technical decision, and vice versa. Ultimately, the goal is to aid in
communication between engineers and policy-makers, so as to avoid
situations that might lead to disastrous outcomes.
2. The literature review and references collected in this body of work are
synthesized to provide a comparison and contrast of political and
engineering decision-making. These are the related to literature on
incremental policy making, with the aim of enabling the system architect
to better understand and anticipate the nature of interactions between the
political and technical environments.
3. The application of game theory, and particularly the Theory of Moves, as
a descriptive tool to understand interactions between the US Congress
and federal agencies. Observations and assertions regarding the validity of
the application of this particular tool are supported by testimony given by
members of Congress and NASA, and news sources. The four general
classes of agency-Congress interactions identified can also serve as
proscriptive guideposts for NASA and other agencies as they prepare
their interactions with Congress in response to current events that drive
Congressional opinion.
4. The four areas for future work identified in this thesis suggest several
possible lines of inquiry that can enrich our collective understanding of
techno-political systems. These areas are as follows:
a. Techno-political interactions under incrementalism: Many
agencies besides NASA are subject to incremental funding.
Creation and oversight of engineering systems within the
bureaucratic and political environments of these agencies is
difficult, largely due to shifting political priorities and the frequent
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lack of a clear national direction. A generalized body of research
characterizing these interactions would allow decision-makers the
ability to discover solutions to these problems when possible, and
to determine under which conditions the government should
engage in techno-political system design and operation.
b. Articulating the costs of legacy component use: It is conventional
wisdom that legacy components have the potential to reduce
costs in engineering system design by obviating the need for
redesign of certain components. Nevertheless, some legacy
components used in some situations may adversely affect system
operation, for example through the presence of unanticipated, or
emergent, behavior. In addition, the costs of incorporating legacy
components may be high, carrying requirements that extend
beyond the engineering domain, such as the need to maintain a
certain workforce or a given facility. The formulation of a
rigorous and inclusive framework for the valuation of legacy
components could help system designers make better decisions
regarding legacy component use, and would therefore be an
important contribution to the engineering systems literature.
c. Determining and incorporating multi-stakeholder valuations into
the design of techno-political systems: Engineering systems
designed within the political environment must often be built to
serve several constituencies. Many stakeholders may agree on the
need for a certain system, although they may have different ideas
in mind for the actual functionality that the system is to deliver.
As such, valuations of a given system are unclear. Future research
into methodologies for determining the needs and values of
stakeholders in engineering systems design can help to determine
how a specific architecture might better serve various
constituencies. Furthermore, such research could facilitate
negotiations between stakeholders, allowing for informed
determinations regarding whether or not a particular stakeholder
should participate in the design process or levy requirements on
the engineering system.
d. Articulating informal negotiations within the government:
Negotiations between agencies and the OMB, or between the
OMB and Congress, or between members of Congress and
individual agencies, are generally not captured in the process of
submitting a formal budget request. Nevertheless, these
interactions have an important effect on the ultimate budgetary
and design outcomes. Capturing these dynamics is difficult since
they are private by design. Nevertheless, an understanding of how
these negotiations occur and are carried out can inform decision-
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making and would provide an important contribution to both the
political science and engineering systems bodies of literature.
Conclusion
This thesis is largely concerned with political sustainability. In the broadest sense,
political sustainability requires an active process of cooperation and coordination
between system architects, political experts and technically-trained engineers.
Most importantly, the interdependence of those in the technical and political
realms must be realized. This requires that the concerns of Congress and other
stakeholders in the political process be explicitly taken into account during the
technical design process. Likewise, political actors must be informed of the
consequences of their decisions upon the technical architectures. Although this
process of information transmission is represented by a "deterrent threat" in the
language of game theory, it does not necessarily have to entail the overt hostility
implied by this term. Rather, communications between representatives of the
President and members of Congress must be structured so as to explicitly reflect
the core values of our elected representatives. These communications must focus
on enabling non-myopic thinking both among agencies and Congress. The role
of the system architect in this regard is therefore one of translator - the architect
must be able link the technical parameters of the engineering system under
consideration to the salient values of the policy-makers who are supporting it. For
this support to be sustained, the architect must be able to translate the long-term
considerations of system design into short-term, frequently-delivered benefits for
the system's stakeholders. To paraphrase (Brundtland, Khalid et al. 1987), the
concept of political sustainability does imply limits - not absolute limits but limits
imposed by existing technological capabilities and political organization on
budgetary resources and by the ability of the taxpayer, through Congress, to fund
the human expansion into space. But technology and political organization can be
both managed and improved to make way for a new era of space exploration.
This thesis takes the first tentative steps in this direction.
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